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ARTICLE 
TAILORING REMEDIES TO SPUR 
INNOVATION 
SARAH R. WASSERMAN RAJEC∗ 
An emerging rule in the district courts—thus far endorsed by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—allows a victorious patent holder to receive a 
permanent injunction against an infringer if she is able to show that she has suffered 
a loss of market share due to the infringement.  The larger the loss of market share the 
patent holder can prove, the more likely the court will issue an injunction.  This 
“market share rule” is a response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., exhorting lower courts to engage in equitable balancing 
before awarding permanent injunctions.  The case followed a flare-up of concern over 
entities—sometimes termed “patent trolls”—that do not practice their patents but 
demand what some consider exorbitant licensing fees from those who would.  These 
entities arguably introduce inefficiencies into the patent system that impede 
innovation, thereby affecting access.  Although academics and practitioners hoped that 
eBay would address particular instances in which the availability of an injunction 
hinders innovation, market share is an imperfect indicator of innovative activity.  
Importantly, for the purpose of identifying entities that hinder innovation, market 
share is simultaneously over- and under-inclusive.  The market share rule is over-
inclusive because some of the business models that currently contribute the most to 
innovation lack market share.  To protect these innovators, courts are contorting the 
emerging rule to grant permanent injunctions for innovative companies that lack 
market share.  The market share rule is also under-inclusive because firms that possess 
high levels of market share have incentives not to bring innovation to market, and yet 
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these incentives are not accounted for under the market share rule. 
A better rule would allow courts to explicitly evaluate the effects of permanent 
injunctions on incentives to innovate and to provide access to that innovation under 
a public interest analysis.  Although loss of market share should remain one measure 
of the need for injunctive relief, its influence should be tempered by a serious analysis 
of the public’s interest in encouraging innovation on the one hand, and access on the 
other.  This more balanced analysis will necessarily include information about market 
structure as well.  A market share rule that incorporates a public interest analysis 
would allow courts to curtail remedies in situations likely to lead to holdups, while 
granting injunctions to entities with business models that rely on licensing fees to fund 
further research, thereby granting remedies tailored to the innovation and access goals 
that form the basis of the patent system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In order to encourage innovation, patent law offers a time-limited 
right to exclude to inventors who disclose their inventions.1  The 
                                                          
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries . . . .”); see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:  
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989), as reprinted in 
MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 33–34 (1998) 
(explaining how the courts expect the right of exclusion to provide an incentive for 
individuals to invest in research and to disclose their new inventions, thereby 
benefiting the general public); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent 
Law Seriously:  The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 
195–97 (2009) (analyzing how the patent system offers a solution to the public goods 
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disclosure-for-protection trade-off assumes that a patent holder will 
use this time to profit from producing or licensing the invention, 
thus rewarding her investment in research and development and 
benefiting the public by granting it access to the technology before 
the patent expires.2  Remedies for infringement of this right may 
include money damages or equitable remedies, such as a permanent 
injunction against future infringement.3  The Supreme Court 
considered the proper analysis for determining whether to grant 
injunctions in patent cases in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.4  This 
Article addresses whether eBay has positively influenced the law such 
that injunctions are being granted in ways that fit the constitutional 
purposes of the patent system, and in particular, the goal of 
encouraging innovation that will result in access to new technology by 
consumers or other innovators.  These goals are generalized versions 
of the concerns that were increasingly voiced in the period before the 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari.5  Specific concerns were focused 
on problems that can be described as “suspect patents,” such as 
improvidently granted or overbroad patents,6 and “suspect entities,” 
                                                          
problem by granting inventors exclusive right to control their invention for twenty 
years). 
 2. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1580 (2003) (discussing how the exclusive rights granted to inventors is a 
limitation society is willing to accept in the name of greater innovation and social 
utility of inventions); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2004) (explaining how the protections offered to inventors 
create incentives or rewards for continued innovation by eliminating the fear that a 
product could be appropriated by a competitor); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a 
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2000) (elaborating 
how the assumption that patent laws lead to innovation is based on market incentives 
causing patentees to act efficiently by licensing their product, which allows for public 
exposure and further innovation). 
 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases 
under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to 
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court 
deems reasonable.”). 
 4. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006). 
 5. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:  
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (2004) (describing how the growing risks of being sued, and 
the royalties patent holders must pay to avoid such lawsuits, have become hurdles 
that further threaten innovation); Michelle Kessler, Patent Lawsuits Hit Tech Titans, 
USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-02-12-patent-
lawsuits_x.htm (mentioning the increasing number of lawsuits large companies face 
from small inventors with broad patents); Bernard Stamler, Battles of the Patents, Like 
David v. Goliath, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006,   http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/21 
/business/businessspecial2/21patent.html?r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print 
(quoting a patent lawyer who likened patent troll activity to “legalized extortion” but 
noting that it is not always clear which actor is like David and which like Goliath 
based on business size alone). 
 6. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 118–19 (discussing how State Street Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
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such as companies that do not practice their patents but exist solely 
to hold up productive companies for exorbitant licensing fees.7  
Problems with overbroad or improvidently granted patents were not 
central to the dispute in eBay, and have since been addressed more 
fully by Bilski v. Kappos8 and the recently enacted America Invents 
Act.9  The Court, however, faced the problem of suspect entities in 
eBay.10  An examination of the case law following eBay demonstrates 
that courts are indeed identifying certain situations in which 
incentives to innovate may be distorted by particular types of patent 
holders that do not practice their patents.  Specifically, courts grant 
injunctions for patent infringement where the patent holder is a 
competitor with significant market share and deny injunctions to 
entities that cannot show market share.11  These decisions are made 
within the framework of the traditional equitable test for injunctions, 
reiterated in eBay.12  Market share is considered significant to 
                                                          
1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998), expanded patentability to include patents on business 
methods). 
 7. See id. at 111–15 (discussing the increased grant of permanent injunctions 
following the formation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit). 
 8. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1001 (2010).  In 2006, it was assumed that 
the Court would address both problems through a pair of cases:  Laboratory Corp. of 
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (LabCorp), 548 U.S. 124, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1065 (2006) (per curiam), for suspect patents, and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006), for suspect entities.  See, e.g., 
Inventing the Future, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/ 
2006-04-03/news/0604030151_1_patent-system-patent-and-trademark-office-
invention (discussing eBay and LabCorp as vehicles to address overbroad patents and 
“automatic injunctions” for “a company whose primary business is enforcing the 
patents it holds”).  LabCorp, however, was dismissed as improvidently granted.  548 
U.S. at 125, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065. 
 9. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6, 18, 22, 125 
Stat. 284, 306, 329, 336 (2011) (including more opportunities for public feedback 
during the application process, a new post-grant review system for patents directed 
toward business methods, and a provision allowing the U.S.P.T.O. to set its own fees, 
thus allowing for more examiners to be hired and the backlog of applications to be 
addressed). 
 10. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (criticizing the appellate 
court’s adoption of “certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief 
could not issue in a broad swath of cases,” and particularly its holding that “a 
‘plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents’ and ‘its lack of commercial activity in 
practicing the patents’ would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would 
not suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue” (citation omitted)).  
Notably, the majority opinion did not explicitly address the application of an 
equitable balancing test to NPEs, while both concurrences did.  Id. at 394–95, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 395–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 11. See infra Part II.C (explaining the new standard courts use to evaluate 
whether to grant permanent injunctions). 
 12. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (noting that the 
familiar principles of equity governing injunctions apply with “equal force” to 
patents). 
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determine the first two factors of that test—irreparable injury and 
inadequacy of monetary damages.13  The other factors, balancing of 
harm to the parties and the public interest, are generally recited pro 
forma, with an assumption that both favor granting an injunction to 
remedy patent infringement.14 
Upon closer examination, however, problems with the emerging 
“market share rule” become apparent.  If the ultimate goal of patent 
law is to produce the optimal level of innovation, and if eBay was 
meant to correct for instances in which incentives to innovate are 
skewed, the current test is incorrect in form and too narrow in 
practice.  Concerns leading to eBay are properly cast as concerns 
about the ability of a patent holder to hold up licensing negotiations, 
thereby impacting potential licensees and the public by withholding 
access to the invention during the life of the patent.  With this 
backdrop of innovation and access concerns, a focus on the factors of 
irreparable injury and inadequacy of money damages misses an 
opportunity to weigh access concerns under the public interest 
factor, where those concerns should be considered.  In addition, 
distortions in incentives to innovate may indeed occur with entities 
that have small amounts of market share, but market share is 
ultimately a poor indicator of innovative potential.  Market share is 
just as likely to tell a story about the stage of development of a 
company.  Even when it describes the business model of a company, 
lack of market share is overbroad, including in its ambit innovative 
research companies and educational institutions.  By privileging 
certain business structures, reliance on market share also hinders the 
emergence of other structures, such as firms that specialize in 
research and development, rather than production and marketing.15  
Importantly, the essential assumption about the generally positive 
correlation between market share and innovative potential of a firm 
also breaks down under scrutiny.  The correlation of market power 
and innovation has been examined by economists and antitrust 
                                                          
 13. E.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1943, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s injunction on these 
factors and citing market share as a key consideration). 
 14. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1447–48, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1191, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing the third and fourth factors briefly 
and weighing them in favor of granting an injunction). 
 15. This particular problem with a categorical rule was pointed out in eBay, too.  
547 U.S. at 393, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (citing, for example, academic 
researchers or inventors who prefer licensing their product rather than seeking 
funding for marketing, finding that “[s]uch patent holders may be able to satisfy the 
traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for categorically denying them the 
opportunity to do so”).  It is unclear how a categorical rule based on market share 
could be more acceptable than the categorical rule struck down in eBay. 
RAJEC.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012  6:52 PM 
738 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:733 
scholars, whose literature suggests what courts have ignored:  that 
high levels of market power16 are also likely to lead to inefficiencies. 
A more effective test would be to return market share to a 
reasonable level of influence as a consideration under the first two 
factors of the equitable test and to adopt an analysis of market share 
(or power) under the public interest factor, which would allow for 
balancing the value of strong patent rights with the public interest in 
access to innovation.17 
The Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, I introduce the purpose 
of the permanent injunction remedy in patent law and its place in the 
balance struck by the patent grant.  In Part II, I review the literature 
surrounding eBay and the concern over patent “holdup” situations, 
particularly in the case of non-practicing entities (NPEs), the eBay 
case, and the concerns voiced in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence that 
appear to have strongly influenced district courts.  I conclude that 
these concerns center on the idea that for certain patent holders, 
incentives are skewed and that rather than leading to optimal levels 
of innovation, they result in reduced access to emerging technologies 
for the public and for other innovators.  I next examine how district 
courts have ruled on permanent injunctions following eBay and their 
focus on the proxy measure of market share to identify these patent 
holders.  I find that, although the problem many hoped the Court 
would remedy concerned the public interest in access, courts 
generally grant injunctions by invoking the irreparable injury and 
inadequacy of money damages prongs of the four-factor test when a 
patent holder shows that it is a competitor with significant market 
share. 
In Part III, I turn to an assessment of the emerging market share 
rule, arguing that by focusing on the identity of the patent holder 
rather than balancing the exclusivity grant against its access benefits, 
the market share rule is both under- and over-inclusive.  However, 
this mis-focus is endemic to an analysis under the first two factors, 
which are centered on the patent holder and do not allow for 
balancing the incentive structure embodied in the patent system with 
the public interest in access to innovation. 
The substance of the rule is of equal concern.  After showing that 
the market share rule imperfectly fulfills the narrow purpose of 
                                                          
 16. See infra Part III.C (discussing how market share and market power are often 
used interchangeably). 
 17. This suggestion finds support—albeit scant—in Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in eBay.  547 U.S. at 395–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing the need to weigh all four factors before 
granting a remedy). 
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denying injunctions to NPEs, Part III analyzes the broader purpose 
behind the patent laws and the grant of a permanent injunction to 
show that the rule may not increase incentives to bring innovation to 
market.  To this end, antitrust theory regarding the relationship 
between market structure and incentives to innovate is instructive.  
Antitrust looks at market power as an indicator of innovative 
potential.  At worst, contradictory and convoluted evidence fails to 
support the idea that market power and innovative potential are 
correlated.  At best, initially competing but ultimately complementary 
antitrust narratives indicate that innovative incentive may increase 
with market power to a certain degree, but then decrease again once 
a certain level of market power has been achieved.  Regarding eBay 
concerns, the implications are that patent holdup and access 
concerns should not be limited to non-practicing or suspect entities, 
but should also be of concern for all companies with high levels of 
market power.  Conversely, a suspect entity with little market power 
will have little ability to hold up competition.  Under this analysis, 
market power as an indicator of potential access concerns emerges as 
a useful addition to market share as an indicator of injury to the 
patent holder when assessing the appropriateness of a permanent 
injunction. 
In Part IV, I examine the public interest prong of the four-factor 
test and find that this inquiry properly allows weighing of the general 
interest in strong patent rights with the public’s interest in access to 
innovation.  I then discuss a pair of cases in which injunctions were 
denied and suggest that the courts employed contorted logic to reach 
their conclusions.  A straightforward consideration of market share 
under a more robust public interest analysis would have resulted in 
the same conclusion, without the contortions.  Thus, the question 
arises why the public interest prong has not been used to deny 
permanent injunctions where there is too little or too much market 
power.  An examination of the eBay decision’s legal progenitor, 
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,18 demonstrates the 
influence of the notion that competitors are more deserving of 
permanent injunctions than non-competitors, while an analysis of the 
public interest prong of the four-factor test is almost absent.  
Nonetheless, I argue that the public interest prong, not the first two 
prongs of eBay, can properly account for situations in which the 
strength of the patent right should be lessened to fix skewed 
                                                          
 18. 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
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incentives that deny the public and other innovators access to 
innovation. 
I. PATENT LAW AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS 
The Constitution ensures the promotion of progress by granting 
inventors exclusive but time-limited rights over their discoveries.19  
The right granted by a patent is the “right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.”20  The 
patent grant incentivizes innovation by rewarding those who invent 
something useful, and it provides knowledge of the innovation to the 
public by dictating that the invention be disclosed and returning the 
invention to the public domain when the patent expires.21  The 
disadvantage of the patent grant is that public access to the invention 
is diminished in various ways:  (1) a monopoly rent can be extracted 
because of the lack of competition, and thus fewer people may be 
willing or able to purchase the invention; (2) other inventions that 
build on the patented invention may be delayed or not occur, thus 
depriving both putative future innovators of the ability to innovate 
and the public of access to a future innovation; and (3) the patent 
holder may choose not to bring the invention to market at all.  The 
patent grant is, therefore, a balance of access interests. 
The patent system thus provides incentives to innovate in the form 
of granting a time-limited monopoly, characterized by a right to 
exclude.22  The appropriate remedy for infringement of the patent 
right typically has been deemed the permanent injunction, an 
equitable remedy left to the discretion of the courts.23  The 
justification for granting a permanent injunction as opposed to other 
remedies, such as a reasonable royalty award,24 follows the traditional 
                                                          
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 21. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 
(1998) (“[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages 
both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in 
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”); 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 12–16 (2003) (utilizing “the tragedy of the commons” 
to demonstrate the need for individual property rights in order to encourage 
innovation). 
 22. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (stating that the courts have jurisdiction to grant 
injunctions to prevent patent violations). 
 23. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 430 (explaining that the most effective 
means of enforcing patent rights is to prevent their infringement); John M. Golden, 
Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2120 (2007) 
(discussing how courts at the turn of the twentieth century routinely granted 
injunctions for infringed patents). 
 24. For an argument that federal courts lack authority to grant prospective relief 
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reasoning of property versus liability rules, assuming that for rights 
over inventions whose values are unknown, a property rule is most 
appropriate.25 
As in other areas of law, however, the courts first look to four 
factors when determining whether the equitable remedy of a 
permanent injunction is warranted:  (1) whether denial of the 
injunction would lead to irreparable injury for the patent holder, (2) 
whether money damages are inadequate compensation, (3) whether 
a balance of the hardships to the parties favors either outcome, and 
(4) whether the public interest favors entry of an injunction.26  The 
applicability of the four-factor test to grants of permanent injunctions 
for patent infringement was upheld by the Supreme Court in eBay.27 
However, the eBay Court was focused on particular situations in 
which property rules typically fail, addressed in the two 
concurrences.28  These situations involve what can be described as 
either suspect patents or suspect entities and the concern that holdup 
is more likely to occur where a patent is overbroad or improvidently 
granted or where a patent holder has no economic incentive to limit 
her demands to the worth of the patented invention.29  The second of 
these concerns, suspect entities, generally has focused on patent 
holders who neither produce the patented invention nor license it at 
what is considered a reasonable cost to others.30  Concern about these 
situations provides the backdrop to the Court’s decision. 
Before the Supreme Court decided eBay, permanent injunctions 
were routinely granted following a finding of infringement.  The 
operating assumption was that in rare cases, the public interest in 
                                                          
in such forms, see generally H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in 
Lieu of a Final Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661 (2010) 
(comprehensively discussing and dismissing legal and equitable remedies at common 
law in addition to statutory remedies as bases for a grant of prospective remedies for 
patent infringement).  For a summary of cases in which such ongoing royalties were 
awarded, see id. at 1672–74. 
 25. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 52–54 (2004) (noting the propertization of intellectual 
property law but hailing limits that the property framework imports). 
 26. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1577, 1578 (2006). 
 27. Id. at 394, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580. 
 28. Id. at 394–95, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 
395–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 29. See id. at 395–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(noting that issuance of overbroad patents may affect how courts approach the four-
factor test). 
 30. Such entities are sometimes called “patent trolls,” or, where judgment is 
withheld, “non-practicing entities.”  A useful and generally accepted working 
definition for an NPE is an entity that neither competes with infringers nor 
exclusively licenses to someone who does.  Golden, supra note 23, at 2112, 2114. 
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access to a particular innovation is strong enough that these access 
interests trump the right to exclude.31  In situations that implicated 
public health, for example, permanent injunctions were occasionally 
denied.32  Generally, however, a refusal to grant a permanent 
injunction did not diminish the right to exclude.33  Courts 
understood that strong remedies resulted in strong incentives to 
innovate, and thus the public interest prong of the four-factor test 
was typically considered to favor granting injunctions.34 
II. CONCERNS ABOUT SKEWED INCENTIVES, THE EBAY DECISION, AND 
ITS PROGENY:  A RULE EMERGES 
A. The Path to eBay 
The furor over NPEs and their skewed incentives grew in the years 
leading up to the eBay decision.  Analysis of these concerns has not 
abated following the decision, although it has come to include 
criticism of the scope of the problem,35 the existence of a problem,36 
and the ability of courts to effectively implement a solution.37  NPEs 
entered public consciousness in earnest during the litigation 
                                                          
 31. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 
(2006). 
 32. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593, 21 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 69, 85 (7th Cir. 1934) (declining to enter a permanent injunction 
against the city after a finding of infringement because enjoining use of the sewage 
treatment method would pollute the waters of Lake Michigan and endanger the 
health of the surrounding communities). 
 33. MercExchange, L.L.C., 401 F.3d at 1338, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238–39. 
 34. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1191, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that district courts should focus the public 
interest analysis on whether preliminary relief would harm an existing critical public 
interest, rather than solely protecting rights secured by valid patents); E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Polaroid Graphics Imaging, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1135, 1146, 10 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1579, 1588 (D. Del. 1989) (explaining that without the 
exclusionary nature of patents, innovation would come to a halt, ultimately harming 
the greater public), aff’d, 887 F.2d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 35. See, e.g., Damien Geradin et al., The Complements Problem Within Standard 
Setting:  Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 145 
(2008) (contending that royalty stacking is not common enough or costly enough to 
warrant policy changes, as such changes are likely counterproductive); see also 
Golden, supra note 23, at 2145–47 (criticizing research and literature on excessive 
compensation for patent royalties, finding it is not representative and grossly 
exaggerated). 
 36. Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically 
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 541–42 (2008) (arguing that 
they do not). 
 37. Golden, supra note 23, at 2114 n.16 (dismissing arguments that the threat of 
permanent injunctions causes patent holders to negotiate excessive royalties and 
arguing that the same technique of using the leverage of a monopoly is common in 
other industries). 
RAJEC.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012  6:52 PM 
2012] TAILORING REMEDIES TO SPUR INNOVATION 743 
surrounding BlackBerry technology.38  Research In Motion, the 
makers of BlackBerry wireless e-mail devices, settled an infringement 
lawsuit with the patent-holding company NTP for $612.5 million to 
avoid the entry of a permanent injunction.39  The popularity of the 
devices, and the threat that millions of consumers would no longer 
be able to use them, grabbed public attention.40 
The case also demonstrated both of the bogeymen consistently 
referenced in criticism of strong property rights for patents:  suspect 
patents and suspect entities.  The patents at issue covered software, 
the validity of which has been questioned,41 and were criticized as 
improperly granted and excessively broad.42  Moreover, the public 
had a strong interest in access to the infringing device, whereas the 
patent holder did not use the patented technology, but rather made 
money by licensing that technology.  The availability of permanent 
injunctions thus became a concern in situations that involved either 
                                                          
 38. See Megan L. Wiggins, Patent Reform and Damages Apportionment:  Addressing the 
Concerns of Industry-Scale Users of the U.S. Patent System Without Legislatively Mandating a 
“Specific Contribution over the Prior Art,” 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 273, 289 (2010) (noting 
that increased public scrutiny of patent trolls was associated with the landmark case 
of NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
1857 (E.D. Va. 2005)). 
 39. NTP, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 785–89, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860–61 (denying 
RIM’s motion to stay decision); see also Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 
Million Settlement, CNN MONEY (Mar. 3, 2006, 7:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/ (describing the settlement agreement). 
 40. See Kelley, supra note 39 (reporting that the lawsuit threatened to shut down 
e-mail service for three million users). 
 41. Recently, however, in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001 (2010), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that software was indeed patentable in 
accordance with State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 
F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227, 95 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (noting that the machine-or-transformation test may not 
be helpful for software); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, The Compatibility of Patent Law and 
the Internet, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2783, 2792–94 (2010) (arguing that software should 
be patentable). 
 42. Ian Austen & Lisa Guernsey, A Payday for Patents ‘R’ Us; Huge BlackBerry 
Settlement Is Grist for Holding Company, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2005, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B00EFD61E31F931A35756C0A96
39C8B63&pagewanted=all.  Indeed, the patents asserted against RIM were 
simultaneously challenged at the U.S.P.T.O. in a reexamination procedure, as were 
various patents NTP asserted against other mobile telephone companies.  The Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the invalidation of at least portions of 
NTP’s reexamined patents.  Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4603, 2009 WL 5449437 
(B.P.A.I. Dec. 22, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-1116, 2009 WL 4694996 
(B.P.A.I. Dec. 3, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4587, 2009 WL 4695029 
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 27, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4606, 2009 WL 3837021 
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 10, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4602, 2009 WL 3837020 
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 10, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4601, 2009 WL 3837019 
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 10, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4594, 2009 WL 3793380 
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 10, 2009).  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, deciding an 
appeal for each of these cases, recently reversed in part and vacated in part.  In re 
NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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suspect patents or suspect entities because both were considered to 
present a higher likelihood of being misused—that is, asserted in a 
way that expands the intended scope of the patent.43 
Some of this sudden and particular concern can be traced to 
emerging technology sectors.  Near the end of the twentieth century, 
new technologies and business models were emerging.44  The 
burgeoning information technology field presented the possibility for 
holdup as a result of its complex, multipart semi-conductor chips.45  
New business models included companies that, rather than practicing 
the technology themselves, made a business of buying patents from 
start-ups or others and aggressively enforcing their exclusive rights in 
order to extract high licensing fees.46  Complex inventions are 
particularly susceptible to holdup by such NPEs that have nothing to 
lose by refusing to license—except for the licensing fees—and do not 
anticipate a need for reciprocity from other companies in case of 
their own future infringement.47  These conditions encourage 
                                                          
 43. Although the concerns leading up to and addressed in eBay try to remedy an 
overly broad assertion of patent scope, refusal to practice or license a patent does not 
fall into the formal category of “patent misuse,” a traditional defense to a claim of 
patent infringement.  Under that defense, a patent will not be enforced when a 
patentee has sought to extend the patent grant beyond its scope, such as by tying 
sales of a secondary product to those of a primary patented product or entering into 
a contract to extend patent protection beyond its term.  Analysis often runs along 
antitrust doctrine, although elements of misuse stem from the public policy of the 
patent system alone.  HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.2a, at 3-3 to 3-5 
(Supp. 2009) (discussing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)).  However, § 271(d) of the patent statute 
explicitly states that refusal to license a patent or use the technology embodied 
therein does not constitute misuse, unless the patentee has significant market power.  
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).  Thus, even though patent misuse may have independent 
policy bases in antitrust law, current analysis of nonuse of a patent does not allow for 
a finding of misuse if there is not also an element of monopolization of the market. 
 44. New technologies include business methods used in financial markets.  
Another expanding technology was software, which because of its short lead time 
and the speed of innovation, arguably does not even benefit from the patent system.  
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited:  The Case Against Patent Protection for 
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1028–30 
(1990) (debating the patentability of newly emerging computer programs and 
algorithms). 
 45. See Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samardzija, Compulsory Patent Licensing:  Is 
It a Viable Solution in the United States?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 509, 510–
11 (2007) (explaining how new technology is particularly susceptible to holdup due 
to “patent thicket,” where hundreds of patents are needed for a single product, yet 
they all overlap and block one another). 
 46. Robin M. Davis, Note, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls:  Permanent 
Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and 
eBay v. MercExchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 437–38 (2008) (focusing 
on companies whose sole purpose is to purchase patented technology from bankrupt 
companies for a low price and then threaten companies in that specific technology 
area with a lawsuit to extract expensive royalties). 
 47. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. 
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extraction of licensing fees that include value added by other 
components of the final product and thus exceed the value of the 
patent.  As a result, rather than reveling in their own strong property 
rights in patents, large businesses sounded the alarm on “patent 
trolls.”48  One concern was that, particularly in industries where 
products are typically covered by multiple patents, a single patent 
holder could extract licensing fees that reflect the value of the entire 
product and that are thus well beyond the value of a single patent to 
the end product.49 
NPEs may also be problematic because the transaction costs they 
impose may have no payoff in the currency of patent law.  For 
example, an alleged infringer may have independently invented and 
produced its goods, deriving no benefit of disclosure from the patent 
that is asserted against it.  Another inefficiency may occur when an 
inventor files for numerous continuations or continuations-in-part at 
the patent office and is thereby able to capture subject matter of 
competitor products.  The strategy of pursuing such patents, called 
“submarine patents,” results in the competitor manufacturer 
assuming the risk of bringing the product to market, while the patent 
holder reaps the rewards.50  In all of these cases, innovation is 
                                                          
L. REV. 1991, 2015 (2007) (explaining that the risk of holdup is high for complex 
inventions where there is no reciprocal risk of litigation and that NPEs bring a 
significant portion of infringement suits in industries subject to royalty stacking). 
 48. Then-Assistant General Counsel for Intel, Peter Detkin, is credited with 
coining the term “patent troll” in 1999 to refer to “somebody who tries to make a lot 
of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of 
practicing and in most cases never practiced.”  Daniel J. McFeely, Comment, An 
Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn 
Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289, 294 (2008) (quoting Lisa Lerer, Mind 
Games, IP LAW & BUSINESS, May 2006, at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But 
see Golden, supra note 23, at 2114 (noting the shifting definition of a “patent troll” 
depending on the purposes of the speaker). 
 49. A different suggestion for identifying holdup situations requires determining 
whether “the patented component contributes only a small portion of the value of 
the end product; the infringement is inadvertent; the cost of designing around ex 
post . . . exceeds the cost of designing around ex ante; and the probability of 
detection is high.”  Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust 
Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1181 (2009) (citing Vincenzo Denicoló et al., Revisiting 
Injunctive Relief:  Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent 
Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571, 582 (2008)). 
 50. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 25, at 111–12 (considering ways to prevent 
“submarine patenting,” including prosecution laches, which precludes unreasonable 
delay in prosecuting the patent); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse 
of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 79 (2004) (detailing the  manner in which 
patent holders take certain industries by surprise by intentionally delaying the 
issuance of their patent as the value of the technology increases, thereby capitalizing 
on the unsuspecting company’s desperation to preserve its investments when 
claiming infringement).  Although some of these patents still exist, the problem has 
been mitigated with a patent term that no longer runs from the date of issuance, but 
rather from the date of filing of the earliest, related patent.  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) 
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occurring in spite of, rather than because of, the specific patent at 
issue.51  Such situations are troubling because they present 
inefficiencies that are not accounted for in the traditional balance 
struck by the patent system, imposing costs that are arguably higher 
than Congress intended.  The easy availability of a permanent 
injunction, critics argue, allows exploitation of such inefficiency.52 
Concerns about suspect entities have been voiced by industry,53 
government,54 and academics alike.55  Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro 
analyzed patent holdup situations, concluding that the threat of a 
permanent injunction led to systematically high royalty rates in 
licensing agreements, thus hindering innovation.56  The leverage for 
these market distortions, according to Lemley and Shapiro, “comes 
from the ability of a patent owner to capture value that has nothing 
to do with its invention.”57  Critics were also concerned with 
innovations in technology sectors such as information technology, 
biotechnology, or medical research, in which multiple patents were 
likely to cover any eventual product, with a corresponding increased 
likelihood of patent holdup.58 
                                                          
(2006) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for a 
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the 
date on which the application for the patent was filed . . . .”). 
 51. Of course, a product accused of infringement may well be covered by other 
patents, owned by the alleged infringer, in addition to the NPE’s patent. 
 52. See Davis, supra note 46, at 433–34 (considering how injunctions often place 
NPEs in enhanced bargaining positions and allow them to extract large settlements). 
 53. See, e.g., Brief of American Innovators’ Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 25–30, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1577 (2006) (No. 05-130); Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of 
Petitioner at 5–14, eBay, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (No. 05-130); Brief 
of International Business Machines Corp. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 16–18, eBay, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (No. 05-130). 
 54. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33–56 
(2007), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf. 
 55. E.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 1992–94; Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. 
Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786–
88 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One 
Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 151–55 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and 
Patent Royalties, 1–5 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/royalties.pdf.  Much has been written 
specifically about holdup problems in the context of standard-setting organizations.  
See, e.g., Jonathan L. Rubin, Patents, Antitrust, and Rivalry in Standard-Setting, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 509, 536 (2007) (challenging violations of standard setting as inefficient 
and wasteful); Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power:  Its Potential for Addressing the 
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 729–33 (2005) 
(insisting that standard-setting organizations should encourage more disclosure and 
take greater strides to prevent patent holdup). 
 56. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2009. 
 57. Id. at 2010. 
 58. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 480 SCI. 698, 698–700 (1998) (arguing that 
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Critics became particularly concerned with the idea that NPEs had 
skewed incentives to license, enabling them to extract a higher value 
from patents than their patents warranted.59  This inefficiency 
negatively affected the ability of actual innovators to bring new 
products to market.60  The problematic scenarios under discussion at 
the time the Court decided eBay can be characterized as access 
problems.  The balance struck by the patent grant rests on the 
assumption that the public will benefit from the disclosure of the 
invention and from the invention’s entry into the market.61  For 
example, NPEs do not bring products to market by definition, thus 
preventing consumers from accessing products.  In addition, because 
NPEs have skewed incentives to hold out for higher licensing fees 
than their patents are worth,62 it is less likely that another company 
will bring the invention to market.  If the product is commercialized 
despite the higher licensing fees, those fees will be passed on to 
consumers, making the product sell above the price point some are 
willing or able to pay.63  Overbroad or improvidently granted patents 
likewise add a cost to any product they appear to cover, thus raising 
any consequent market cost and resulting, again, in less public 
access.64  Patents that cover one component of a complex product 
and that are used to extract unduly high rents affect both access by 
                                                          
biomedical research is approaching a privatization model). 
 59. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 1992–93 (reiterating how NPEs are 
empowered by the threat of injunction, as they can demand excessive royalties from 
desperate infringers). 
 60. Id. at 1993 (declaring that the excessive royalties charged by NPEs create a 
tax on products using the technology, making an obstacle to further innovation). 
 61. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 547–50 (2009) 
(discussing the importance of the disclosure function to patent law). 
 62. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 1992–93 (citing the power that NPEs 
have during negotiations as the reason they can hold out). 
 63. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38–41 (2003) (explaining that higher 
royalties paid means higher prices for consumers, which results in low product use 
and deadweight on the market). 
 64. In general, overbroad or improvidently granted patents, or “suspect patents,” 
are most easily addressed by invalidation or narrowing of patents based on the 
statutory criteria for patentability, such as novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), non-
obviousness, id. § 103, and written description and enablement, id. § 112.  Lemley 
and Shapiro addressed the problem of weak patents with suspect validity.  Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2038.  In these cases, they explain, accused infringers may 
settle for more than the value of the patent, given the uncertainty of whether it will 
be held invalid.  Id.  They suggest that allowing a stay for a design-around will also 
help in such cases, as accused infringers can wait out litigation, knowing they will 
have time to redesign their products if and when the patent is held valid, while 
paying only a reasonable royalty.  Id. at 2039–40.  Like others, however, they 
ultimately think that the main effort to control suspect patents should come from 
minimizing the grant of weak patents and allowing for increased post-grant 
opposition.  Id. at 2044. 
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the entity trying to manufacture the complex invention and, 
subsequently, public access to the finished invention.  Lemley and 
Shapiro analyzed the problem in terms of economic incentives, but 
their ultimate concern was spurring socially desirable investments in 
innovation.65  By voicing the basis for their economic analysis, Lemley 
and Shapiro emphasize that these concerns are fundamentally about 
supporting the optimum level of innovation so that the innovation 
may be secured to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”66 
Proposed solutions, for the most part, focused on the adequacy of 
money damages and irreparable injury factors of the four-factor 
equitable test, to the near exclusion of the remaining factors:  
balancing the hardships to the parties and weighing the public 
interest.  Thus, these proposed solutions rest on the assumption that 
application of the first two factors can be tailored to the patentee to 
produce incentives for an optimal level of innovation.  For example, 
one of the amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court in eBay voiced 
concerns regarding NPEs and holdups for complex inventions and 
suggested that a more robust analysis of the adequacy of money 
damages would allow courts to deny injunctions to entities that “seek 
only to license their invention at a reasonable royalty.”67  A strong 
assumption in this entire strain of thought is that there is no risk of 
holdup where a patentee or its exclusive assignee or licensee 
competes significantly in the market.68 
B. The eBay Decision 
The path of the eBay case from the district court to the Supreme 
Court has been well-documented.69  Following a jury verdict of willful 
                                                          
 65. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 2163, 2164 (2007) (“If we made any error, it was in assuming that 
readers would understand that holdup is recognized as a form of market failure that 
leads to inefficiency, primarily by discouraging what would otherwise be socially 
desirable investments.”). 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and 
the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 421, 428 (2007) 
(suggesting that one possible reading of the grant of certiorari in eBay was that the 
Court should determine how the standard for injunctive relief under the Patent Act 
would affect innovation.). 
 67. Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of 
Petitioners at 7, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1577 (2006) (No. 05-130). 
 68. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2036. 
 69. See James M. Fischer, The “Right” to Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 4–10 (2007) (outlining Justice Thomas’s 
majority opinion in eBay and each of the concurrences); infra notes 86–87 (citing to 
post-eBay scholarship and cases that demonstrate courts’ emphasis on direct 
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infringement against eBay, the district court determined that patent 
holder MercExchange was not entitled to a permanent injunction.70  
The court stated that there was a presumption of irreparable injury 
that was rebutted by MercExchange’s willingness to license its 
technology, lack of commercial activity, and statements to the media 
about its litigation strategy.71 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding, 
concluding that the facts of the case were not “sufficiently 
exceptional to justify the denial of a permanent injunction.”72  As to 
irreparable injury and the adequacy of money damages, the court 
stated that enforcement of the right to exclude through grant of an 
injunction was “not reserved for patentees who intend to practice 
their patents, as opposed to those who choose to license.”73  In so 
holding, the court also noted that “in rare instances,” courts 
exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief “in order to 
protect the public interest,” such as declining to enter an injunction 
when there was a need to use patented technology to protect public 
health.74 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit, 
holding that there was no “general rule that courts will issue 
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent 
exceptional circumstances.”75  The Court further held that the district 
court had wrongly applied the equitable test by adopting “expansive 
                                                          
competition and market share in determining the irreparable injury and inadequacy 
of money damages prongs of the equitable test). 
 70. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 715 (E.D. Va. 2003), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
vacated, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006). 
 71. Id. at 712.  The court cited the public interest in granting strong patents, but 
concluded that the questionable nature of business method patents and the value in 
having business methods practiced both weighed in favor of denying the injunction.  
Id. at 713–14. 
 72. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 
(2006). 
 73. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238. 
 74. Id. at 1338, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley, 
Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 
858, 865–66, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[S]tandards of the 
public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and 
need for injunctive relief . . . .”)).  The Federal Circuit also noted that concern over 
the nature of the patent—namely, that business method patents are per se suspect—
did not constitute sufficient reason to deny injunctive relief.  Id. at 1339, 74 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237–38. 
 75. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390–96, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1577, 1578 (2006) (quoting MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1238) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
RAJEC.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012  6:52 PM 
750 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:733 
principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad 
swath of cases.”76  The district court had incorrectly concluded that a 
patent holder’s willingness to license its patents and its “lack of 
commercial activity in practicing the patents” established a lack of 
irreparable injury.77  These “broad classifications,” the Court warned, 
would result in the denial of injunctive relief to entities such as 
universities or self-made inventors who preferred to license their 
materials.78 
Both concurrences emphasized that weight should be given to 
relevant precedent.  Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia 
and Ginsburg, emphasized that the equitable test was not being 
performed on a clean slate and that protection of the right to 
exclude often implicated the equitable remedy of an injunction, 
“implicat[ing] the first two factors of the traditional four-factor test.”79  
While noting that history might indeed be instructive, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Breyer, stated that new situations might call for new analysis, 
specifically pointing to the rise of suits by NPEs in addition to 
business method patents.80  As a result, Justice Kennedy appeared to 
be charging lower courts with giving weight to the identity of the 
patentees (i.e., practicing versus non-practicing entities) and the type 
of patent at issue (i.e., business method and otherwise suspect patents 
versus more “legitimate” patents) in evaluating the appropriateness 
of a permanent injunction.81  The eBay Court clearly expresses a 
concern over NPEs and their effect on other entities’ level of 
innovation. 
Although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence specifically mentioned 
suspect patents and suspect entities as being less deserving of 
injunctions, the context was not entirely confined to the first two 
prongs of the equitable test—irreparable injury and the adequacy of 
money damages.  Justice Kennedy wrote that in cases in which patents 
are owned by suspect entities, “legal damages may well be sufficient to 
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the 
public interest.”82  Although Justice Kennedy identifies money damages 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 393, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 77. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 79. Id. at 395, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 396, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 81. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581 (stating that there were new considerations 
for courts, such as “the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic 
function of the patent holder”). 
 82. Id. at 396–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581 (emphasis added). 
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as a primary indicator, he also specifically identifies the public 
interest as an important factor in deciding whether an injunction is 
appropriate.83  By focusing only on whether an injunction is the 
appropriate remedy for an NPE, courts and scholars have missed the 
opportunity to evaluate the appropriateness of an injunction under 
the public interest prong of the equitable test. 
As detailed in the following section, however, this invitation to take 
a second look at the public interest prong of the four-factor test has 
not been taken up by the lower courts.  As a result, the first two 
factors have been twisted to include an analysis that could be done 
less tortuously via the fourth factor. 
C. eBay’s Progeny:  The Market Share Rule 
In the wake of eBay, the Federal Circuit has affirmed district court 
decisions that have granted injunctions for competitors who show a 
loss of market share as a result of infringement.84  It has also affirmed 
court decisions that have denied permanent injunctions in cases 
where an infringer has contested the patentee’s right on the basis 
that the parties are not competitors.85  These factors are almost 
entirely analyzed under the irreparable injury and adequacy of 
money damages prongs of the equitable test.  The general rule 
emerging in the courts is that irreparable injury and the inadequacy 
of money damages may be proved when the plaintiff is a direct 
market competitor86 that practices in the area of its invention,87 and 
                                                          
 83. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
 84. E.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1943, 1968 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 
(2011). 
 85. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1001, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s denial of a 
permanent injunction); see also Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 
684, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (same). 
 86. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 
126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006):  A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 631, 654 (2007) (collecting and analyzing post-eBay cases and finding 
direct competition to be “the most significant predictor of whether a permanent 
injunction will be granted”); see also Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange:  The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
543, 549–55 (2008) (discussing courts’ reliance on direct competition as a means for 
determining the appropriateness of an injunction); Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive 
Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 196–98 (2008) (examining 
post-eBay decisions and finding that courts “place a heavy emphasis” on whether the 
parties are in “direct competition”). 
 87. See Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls:  The Pitfalls of the Emerging 
Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 305, 310–22 (2007) (collecting post-eBay cases and finding that 
injunctions were granted where the patent holder could show commercialization 
within the area of invention of the patent). 
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the patent holder can show a loss of market share—particularly in 
nascent markets.88  The results in these cases, for the most part, 
respond to concerns of the pre-eBay availability of injunctions to 
NPEs:  injunctions are denied to non-competitors who have no 
market share, presumably because they neither produce nor market 
the patented product.89  For example, on remand after the Supreme 
Court’s decision, the district court in eBay noted MercExchange’s 
inability to demonstrate lost market share in finding that there was 
no irreparable injury and that money damages would be adequate.90 
The emerging rule goes further, however.  Instead of simply using 
the lost market share as an indicator of irreparable injury and 
inadequacy of money damages, courts correlate the size of the market 
share and the resulting entitlement to an injunction.  For example, 
the district court found irreparable injury and inadequacy of 
monetary damages for direct market competitors in Muniauction, Inc. 
                                                          
 88. TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 532–34 (D. Del. 
2008) (granting injunction where there were only two competitors in the market and 
the infringer had taken away “the recognition of being a technology innovator and 
the first global supplier of the patented technology, and an unquantifiable amount 
of business opportunities flowing therefrom”); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns 
Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669–71 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (granting a permanent 
injunction where parties were direct competitors and “[p]laintiff [was] losing market 
share at a critical time in the market’s development”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 516 
F.3d 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Callaway Golf Co. v. 
Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 619, 621 (D. Del. 2008) (discussing the role of 
competition when considering a permanent injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
576 F.3d 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. 
v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 WL 4531371, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008) 
(noting patent holder’s trial testimony that “distribution to its customer base, or its 
market share, is one of its most important assets” in finding irreparable injury and 
granting permanent injunction), aff’d, 595 F.3d 1340, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1805 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-32 
(TJW), 2007 WL 869576, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21 2007) (granting an injunction 
where parties are direct competitors), vacated on other grounds, 521 F.3d 1351, 86 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Petersen, supra note 86, at 198 (“To 
measure the level of competition between the parties, courts often considered the 
loss of market share by the patent holder.”). 
 89. See Praxair, Inc.  v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007) 
(denying a permanent injunction because plaintiff could not show loss of market 
share); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1737, 1739 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (same). 
 90. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 590 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1688, 1713 (E.D. Va. 2007); see also Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. 
Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007) 
(granting a permanent injunction following a finding of irreparable harm); Paice 
LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4–5 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (denying injunction and noting that there is no market share to 
be lost in finding no irreparable injury), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293, 85 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007); z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 440, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739 (finding no irreparable injury where patentee would not 
“suffer lost profits, the loss of brand name recognition or the loss of market share” 
due to infringement). 
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v. Thomson Corp.,91 stating that “[p]laintiff and defendants are direct 
competitors in a two-supplier market.  If plaintiff cannot prevent its 
only competitor’s continued infringement of its patent, the patent is 
of little value.”92  The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s lost sales to 
the defendants caused additional harm, such as loss of market share 
and harm to the plaintiff’s reputation as an innovator.93  Similarly, in 
Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp.,94 the court granted a 
permanent injunction where the infringing product was the patent 
holder’s only competition because “its sale reduces the [patent 
holder’s] market share.”95  In contrast, another court denied an 
injunction in a situation with only one additional market participant, 
finding that the third actor in the market made it unclear that the 
infringing sales took market share from the patentee.96 
Examining market share has allowed courts to issue injunctions for 
                                                          
 91. 502 F. Supp. 2d 477 (W.D. Pa. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 532 F.3d 
1318, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 92. Id. at 482 (finding some of the patent claims obvious and others not 
infringed). 
 93. Id.; see also TruePosition Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (finding irreparable injury 
stemming from denial of “the recognition of being a technology innovator and the 
first global supplier of the patented technology, and an unquantifiable amount of 
business opportunities flowing therefrom”); Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 
474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 612–13 (D. Del. 2007) (granting a permanent injunction where 
patent holder exclusively licensed patents to U.S. subsidiaries and infringement was 
by a direct competitor); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401, 
420–21 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (granting injunction after finding that “MPT invented a 
method, actively created a market, and established a strong market position and 
customer goodwill” and that “[u]surping this market by inducing or contributing to 
infringement will irreparably harm MPT”) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 258 F. App’x 318 
(Fed. Cir. 2007).  But see Praxair, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (denying a permanent 
injunction where plaintiff alleged loss of market share, profits, and goodwill, but did 
not point to specific sales or market data showing a loss). 
 94. 513 F. Supp. 2d 578 (D. Md. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 543 F.3d 1342, 88 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 95. Id. at 586; see also Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 
537, 558–59 (D. Del. 2007) (finding irreparable injury and inadequacy of money 
damages and granting injunction where infringer was the “only competitor in the 
vegetarian DHA market for adult foods and beverages”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 579 F.3d 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Transocean 
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 WL 
3813778, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (granting a permanent injunction where 
the market for deep water drill rigs was small and defendant competed for 
customers, using the infringing products to win bids). 
 96. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 
2d 554, 558–60 (D. Del. 2008) (noting the public interest merits in providing access 
to different types of stents); see also IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 
487, 489 (D. Del. 2009) (denying an injunction where it did not appear that the 
parties were “the only market participants”).  But see Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet 
Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 620–21 (D. Del. 2008) (granting an injunction where the 
market contained multiple competitors because infringement began during 
innovative period and it was impossible to tell what share of that patent holder would 
have captured absent infringement), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 576 F.3d 1331, 91 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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unused patents where the patent holder has likely made a business 
decision to employ other technology.  Thus, courts have 
distinguished between entities that do not practice any patents and 
competitors that have chosen not to practice a particular patent.  For 
example, in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,97 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the right to an injunction of a competitor not practicing a 
patent in a case with facts similar to Continental Paper Bag.98  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that allowing Qualcomm to sell infringing chips 
would irreparably harm Broadcom’s efforts to market its competing 
products that were not covered by the patents.99  The Broadcom 
decision reinforces courts’ hands-off approach where business 
decisions are involved in a determination neither to use nor license 
patented technology. 
A corollary to courts’ interest in the size of market share held by a 
patentee is the weight given to patent holders in emerging markets.  
Courts are finding irreparable injury where a patent holder loses its 
opportunity to gain a foothold in an emerging market due to 
infringement.  For example, in TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp.,100 the 
court granted a permanent injunction and noted that, in addition to 
taking market share from the patent holder, the infringer also took 
“the recognition of being a technology innovator and the first global 
supplier of the patented technology, and an unquantifiable amount 
of business opportunities flowing therefrom.”101 
The point as to new technology and emerging markets, however, is 
the market share question from another view.  In a newly developing 
market where there are no possible substitutes for the patented 
technology, the effect an infringing entrant will have on the patent 
                                                          
 97. 543 F.3d 683, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 98. Id. at 702–03, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656–57.  The court found that 
although Broadcom “does not sell or plan to sell” chips embodying the asserted 
patents and rather licenses the technology to downstream user Verizon, the district 
court’s finding of irreparable injury was proper.  Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656–
57.  In so finding, the court emphasized the relationship between Broadcom and 
Qualcomm as indirect competitors, in that they competed for customers “despite 
offering different technology in [their] chipsets.”  Id. at 702, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1656.  The court reemphasized its holding, pursuant to Continental Paper Bag, that 
“[t]here is no requirement in this country that a patentee make, use, or sell its 
patented invention” to qualify for the grant of a permanent injunction.  Id. at 703, 88 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 100. 568 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D. Del. 2008). 
 101. Id. at 532; see also Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., No. 04-CV-513-BR, 2007 WL 
4180682, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 2007) (“Loss of market share in this nascent market 
is a key consideration in finding that Plaintiff suffers irreparable harm . . . .” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 551 F.3d 1323, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1612 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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holder’s market share will be more dramatic than in a crowded 
market, where substitutions abound.  In a market with many actors, a 
patent holder’s market share is less likely to be affected by an 
infringer’s entry.  A company in a volatile, undeveloped market has 
more to gain in terms of market share than one in an established 
market.102  In these cases, however, the injury is more difficult both to 
calculate and to remedy, thus supporting the idea that an injunction 
may be more appropriate than money damages in finding the proper 
balance between liability and property rules.103 
The Federal Circuit, exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
appeals, has also begun to weigh in on implementation of eBay.104  
The Federal Circuit has not always treated lost market share and lost 
sales as dispositive to determinations of irreparable injury.105  Yet the 
court affirmed the entry of an injunction where lost market share was 
shown, even when weighed against an alleged willingness to license.106  
Indeed, the court has noted that “[p]ast harm to a patentee’s market 
share, revenues, and brand recognition is relevant to determining 
                                                          
 102. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (D. Del. 
2008) (holding that irreparable harm exists because plaintiff lost its opportunity to 
enhance its goodwill and brand loyalty during a critical time period for 
development), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 576 F.3d 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 103. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972); see 
ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 38–41 (2005) (arguing that injunctive relief 
should be the general default remedy for patent infringement for the traditional 
reasons property rules are seen to trump liability rules). 
 104. Certainly, the standard of review dictating that the entry or denial of a 
permanent injunction be reviewed for an abuse of discretion limits the court’s review 
to a certain extent.  At a minimum, however, a court that does not engage in 
weighing the four factors will find its decision vacated and remanded.  See, e.g., 
Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1352, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1235 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding where the district court did not make any 
factual findings regarding the four factors). 
 105. See, e.g., Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1558, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1781, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument “that potential lost sales 
alone could demonstrate ‘manifest irreparable harm’ because acceptance of that 
position would require a finding of irreparable harm to every patentee, regardless of 
the circumstances” (quoting Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 683, 
15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1990))); see also Nutrition 21 v. United 
States, 930 F.2d 867, 871, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding 
in the context of a preliminary injunction that “neither the difficulty of calculating 
losses in market share, nor speculation that such losses might occur, amount to proof 
of special circumstances justifying the extraordinary relief of an injunction prior to 
trial”). 
 106. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1329, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1612, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding no error in the district court’s refusal to 
distinguish this case from other lost market share cases on the basis of the patent 
holder’s prior licensing of the patent—once to settle litigation and once to an entity 
that at the time was not a direct competitor). 
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whether the patentee has suffered an irreparable injury.”107  The 
Federal Circuit now heavily emphasizes the importance of an 
injunction in nascent markets.108  In addition, although the court in 
eBay offered no categorical rule as to the availability of permanent 
injunctions to entities that do not practice their patents, in Voda v. 
Cordis Corp.,109 the Federal Circuit affirmed just such a denial based on 
the district court’s finding that a patent holder had not shown 
irreparable injury when he alleged harm to his exclusive licensee.110 
Most recently, the Federal Circuit took the opportunity to address 
the analysis of irreparable injury in Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon 
Manufacturing Corp.,111 holding that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying an injunction to Bosch and remanding the case 
with instructions to enter an injunction.112  The district court’s 
holding was partly based on grounds that Bosch had failed to show 
irreparable injury where it was “not a clear case of a two-supplier 
market wherein a sale to Pylon necessarily represents the loss of a sale 
to Bosch” and where wiper blades were not “at the core of [Bosch’s] 
business.”113  In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that it was legal 
error to conclude that “the presence of additional competitors, 
without more, cuts against a finding of irreparable harm.”114  The 
Federal Circuit agreed that the existence of a two-player market 
might be substantial grounds for granting an injunction, but 
disagreed that more market competitors should automatically cut 
against an injunction, particularly where the patent holder was 
enforcing its rights against other market participants as well.115  The 
court further held that the district court erred by not crediting 
Bosch’s “unrebutted evidence of loss of market share and access to 
potential customers” and finding that Bosch had indeed been 
                                                          
 107. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861–62, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1943, 1965–68 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 (2011); 
see also O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 449 F. App’x 923, 932 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2011) (explaining that although a permanent injunction is meant 
to halt future irreparable injury, past harm is relevant to determining the irreparable 
nature of the injury). 
 108. Acumed LLC, 551 F.3d at 1327–31, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615–16 (granting 
an injunction due in part to the entrance of a new competitor into the market). 
 109. 536 F.3d 1311, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 110. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756. 
 111. 659 F.3d 1142, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 112. Id. at 1150–51, 1157, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663, 1668. 
 113. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 2d 383, 408 (D. Del. 
2010), rev’d, 659 F.3d 1142, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 114. Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1151, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664. 
 115. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664. 
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irreparably harmed.116  Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to be 
countering the idea that increasing market share correlates with 
increasing irreparable injury.  Nonetheless, the connection between 
lost market share and a showing of irreparable injury remains strong. 
Although the focus on market share is new, the idea that 
competitors are deserving of injunctions, regardless of whether they 
practice a patent, is not.  One of the questions on which certiorari 
was granted in eBay was the validity of the Court’s holding in 
Continental Paper Bag,117 an early-twentieth-century case standing for 
the proposition that non-use of a patent is not grounds for denial of 
an injunction.118  The clear distinction between Continental Paper Bag 
and eBay was that Continental Paper Bag applied to a competitor.119  In 
its Continental Paper Bag holding, the Court entertained the 
infringer’s contention that no permanent injunction should be 
entered for infringement of a “patent the invention covered by which 
has long and always and unreasonably been held in nonuse . . . instead 
of being made beneficial to the art to which it belongs.”120  The Court, 
however, held the nonuse was not unreasonable, based on the 
competitor status of the patent holder.121 
In finding the nonuse not unreasonable, the Continental Paper Bag 
opinion takes as given that the patent holder is the best actor to 
determine when use of a patent will be efficient.122  Specifically, the 
Court addressed the suggestion that injunctive relief should not be 
available for an invention “deliberately held in nonuse for a wrongful 
purpose,”123 then noted that the implied reason for the nonuse in the 
case at hand—making more money with the existing machines than 
could be made using the patented invention—was not 
                                                          
 116. Id. at 1152, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 117. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029, 1029 (2005) (granting 
certiorari in part to determine whether the Court “should reconsider its precedents, 
including Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., on when it is appropriate 
to grant an injunction against a patent infringer” (citation omitted)). 
 118. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).  The 
Continental Paper Bag Court noted that the only historical deviation from that practice 
was during the brief period in which a working requirement was enacted for foreign 
patentees.  Id.  The requirement called for forfeiture of a patent when it was not 
“worked” (i.e., introduced into public use) within the United States.  Id. 
 119. Compare id. at 427 (finding the nonuse of the patent to be a reasonable 
competitor strategy), with eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1579 (2006) (noting that MercExchange had been willing 
to cooperate and license its patents). 
 120. Cont’l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 424. 
 123. Id. at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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unreasonable.124  This reasoning evidences a respect for a patentee’s 
business decision to withhold from the market—and thus, the 
public—technology that might have been superior to that currently 
on the market, specifically noting that a rights holder might choose 
to avoid the expense of building new machinery necessary to 
implement new technology.  This view grants deference to 
competitors in a market, with an economic assumption that 
competitors within a market are best situated to make determinations 
about when it is efficient to practice any given technology.  In 
general, then, courts are now denying injunctions to those entities 
that most concerned scholars, practitioners, and the Supreme Court:  
patent holders who exist only to license, possibly at levels 
approaching holdups.  Courts deny injunctions for suspect entities 
through market share analysis.  Licensors that do not present holdup 
risks, such as research and development shops and universities, have 
still obtained injunctions.125  However, both formalistic and 
substantive problems exist with this approach. 
III. QUESTIONING THE RULE 
A. The Limits of Irreparable Injury and Inadequacy of Money Damages to 
Identify Inefficient Actors 
The market share rule ensures that only actors who practice their 
patents will be entitled to injunctions.126  Moreover, only firms that 
practice in the relevant field of technology will be competitors with 
market share, by definition.  Thus, awarding only ongoing reasonable 
royalties127 to those who have no market share appears to alleviate 
                                                          
 124. Id. at 429. 
 125. See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 
492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (granting a research institution a 
permanent injunction even though the patentee did not sell patented devices). 
 126. The effects of a “lost profits” rule, as suggested by James Fischer, would be 
similar.  See Fischer, supra note 69, at 23–28.  Granting injunctions only to patent 
holders who claim and prove lost profits damages while denying them to patent 
holders who merely claim reasonable royalties would result in a rule where only 
competitors in a market would have recourse to an injunction.  The problems with 
such a rule would be similar to those outlined in the following paragraphs, in that 
such a rule would be over- and under-inclusive.  The only way in which a lost profits 
rule would be better is that, unlike the market share rule, it would not allow 
increased market share to weigh more heavily than a smaller amount of market 
share.  Rather, it would operate as an either/or indicator of appropriateness of an 
injunction.  Regardless, the problems of such a rule and the emergence of a market 
share rule do not make it an attractive alternative to using market power in the 
public interest analysis that I suggest in Part IV. 
 127. Some argue that an award of ongoing, reasonable royalties is essentially the 
same as a compulsory license.  See, e.g., Golden, supra note 23, at 2148 (suggesting 
that a denial of a permanent injunction in favor of a reasonable royalty payment is 
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concerns of holdup128 and ensures that other, non-suspect entities will 
be able to provide the public with access to innovation at a price 
reflective of its value. 
The analysis of holdup concerns, however, is overly focused on the 
identity and business model of the patent holder in a way that does 
not always generate an “appropriate” level of reward.  The supposed 
solution to the perceived inefficiency introduced by suspect entities is 
to limit injunctions for situations “in which the patent holder’s 
predominant commercial interest in bringing a patent infringement 
case is to obtain licensing revenues.”129  In terms of form, this 
emerging competitor-with-market-share rule is over-inclusive.  A rule 
allowing only practicing entities the remedy of an injunction 
reallocates the monopoly gains in interactions among companies that 
specialize in research and development on the one hand, and mass 
production, sales, and marketing on the other.130  For companies that 
focus on research and development rather than commercialization, 
licensing fees and the proceeds from selling intellectual property 
provide profit and fund future activities.131  Without the threat of an 
injunction, however, such companies are likely to come away from 
negotiations with less compensation.132  Thus, the allocation of any 
gains attributable to the patent monopoly could be strongly shifted 
toward entities willing to take the commercial risks of bringing a 
                                                          
essentially a compulsory license).  If true, compliance with our international 
obligations under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement 
might also be implicated by the emerging rule.  See Andrew C. Mace, Note, TRIPS, 
eBay, and Denials of Injunctive Relief:  Is Article 31 Compliance Everything?, 10 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 232, 245 (2009) (discussing the WTO definition of a compulsory 
license).  But see Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support 
of Petitioners, supra note 67, at 9 (explaining that an ongoing royalty differs from a 
compulsory license because it only applies between parties to the lawsuit, whereas a 
compulsory license is a license available to anyone who meets its terms). 
 128. See supra Part II.A (discussing the holdup concerns leading to the eBay 
decision). 
 129. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2036. 
 130. According to the report recently released by the Federal Trade Commission, 
large companies specializing in various technologies have come to pursue “open 
innovation” strategies, whereby they combine their internal R&D efforts with outside 
sources such as universities, start-ups, and collaborations with other companies.  FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:  ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND 
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 34–35 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/ 
03/110307patentreport.pdf. 
 131. See Golden, supra note 23, at 2157 (discussing how small firms use patents to 
gain revenue for the immediate future); Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why 
Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1075 (2008) (noting that “the 
threat of damages,” amongst other factors, leads alleged infringers to often pay for 
licenses, thus creating an incentive for companies to seek a patent). 
 132. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection:  A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1813, 1835 (1984) (noting that incentives to innovate are affected by whether the 
reward can be reasonably expected, ex ante). 
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product to market, rather than those assuming the risk of the initial 
innovation.  This shift is problematic in one sense because the 
Constitution allows a grant of exclusive rights to “Inventors,” not to 
firms taking on the risk of marketing an invention.133  The market 
share rule devalues the actual invention and reallocates part of the 
patent’s worth to those who compete in the market, regardless of 
whether those entities choose to practice a particular patent.134  More 
importantly, however, it discourages the trend of “open innovation” 
that many companies are beginning to follow,135 and does so without 
regard to the consequences.  Although purporting to target 
businesses whose main litigation purpose is exorbitant licensing fees, 
the emerging rule cannot distinguish among businesses that have no 
market share, and thus includes other business models, such as 
research and development start-ups and universities.  These other 
business models may be driving innovation now and in the near 
future,136 but by implementing a test that cannot distinguish start-ups 
and universities from NPEs, their patent rights become worth less 
than those of firms with market share.  By reducing the available 
rewards to innovative firms that do not practice their inventions, 
then, the rule disincentivizes some of the business structures that are 
currently driving innovation. 
Substantively, John Golden criticized Lemley and Shapiro’s 
approach for ignoring the motivations and economic considerations 
of patent holders.137  For example, Golden argues that the cost of 
litigation should cause the patent holder to settle for less than it 
would ultimately receive in damages.138  In addition to costs, litigation 
carries with it uncertainty.  Far worse than losing a particular 
infringement action, a patent holder faces the possibility that her 
                                                          
 133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 
U.S. 405, 422–23 (1908) (proclaiming that the constitutional policy of patent law is 
to promote the progress of science and art by securing rights to inventors for their 
respective discoveries). 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 97–103 (discussing the market share rule). 
 135. See supra note 130 (describing the trend of large companies focusing on 
R&D). 
 136. See supra note 130. 
 137. Golden, supra note 23, at 2136; see also Dennis Crouch, Reviewing Part III of 
Innovation for the 21st Century:  Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 587, 588 (2010) (book review) (noting that it is unclear 
“whether it is worth the added litigation expense and reduced patent incentive in 
order to shadow box with the mythical patent created holdup problems”). 
 138. Golden, supra note 23, at 2128–29.  These views both deal with the 
motivations of the parties to litigation, and they assume that the public will be best 
served by the proper allocation of rights between them.  As discussed below, infra 
note 173 and accompanying text, antitrust law is implicated when the interests of the 
parties do not balance out to meet those of the public, generally, and efficient levels 
of innovation are not likely to occur. 
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patent will be found invalid.139  Even an owner of a patent that was 
properly granted must face the possibility that it will be found invalid 
by the court.  This possibility should also lower any potential 
settlement figure.  Golden focuses on the considerations a patent 
holder faces in choosing enforcement options to show that incentives 
for holdup may not be as strong as Lemley and Shapiro suggest, in 
addition to challenging the scope of any such holdup.140  The extent 
to which the first two prongs of the equitable test can be employed to 
weaken the incentives of suspect entities to engage in holdup is thus 
open to debate.  However, even when these factors can be useful, 
market share is not always the best indicator of the existence of 
incentives to innovate. 
B. The Limits of Market Share as an Indicator of Irreparable Injury and 
Inadequacy of Money Damages 
Although this Part continues to question the emerging rule, the 
good news is that courts appear to be getting the right result in terms 
of addressing the specific, limited problem eBay was meant to fix.  For 
the most part, injunctions are still available to patent holders 
prevailing on an infringement claim.  Courts, however, are not 
issuing injunctions to some NPEs that exist only to license.  In this 
sense, the prescribed patent scheme is now one in which the public 
and other innovators in the art have a right to access that is cabined 
only by the rights of a patent holder with a well-established market 
share to make business decisions as to which products are efficient 
for it to produce or license.  However, irreparable injury and 
inadequacy of money damages are factors that focus entirely on the 
patent holder’s incentives, and thus differ from access concerns, 
which explicitly account for the public’s interest in the patent 
grant.141  Obtaining the “correct” result has sometimes demanded 
slight legal contortions.  For example, one court found that a 
patentee that licensed its patent and relied on licensing fees to fund 
its research—and thus had no market share—was nonetheless 
entitled to an injunction.142  The court reasoned that the loss of 
                                                          
 139. See Golden, supra note 23, at 2134 (providing that if the patent is invalidated 
the patent holder loses the revenue that its patent could have generated); Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75, 76 (2005) 
(explaining that the risk of patent invalidation is substantial since roughly half of all 
litigated patents are found to be invalid). 
 140. Golden, supra note 23, at 2132–35. 
 141. See, e.g., ALAN R. THIELE, ET AL., THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION 
HANDBOOK:  AVOIDANCE AND MANAGEMENT 216 (2010) (explaining the various 
interests a court could consider in determining whether to grant an injunction). 
 142. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 
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future research opportunities otherwise would be irreplaceable.143  
The court’s reasoning in that case demonstrates both the problems 
with using market share to identify inefficient actors and with 
assuming NPEs are not irreparably injured and unable to be 
adequately compensated by monetary damages.  In fact, the 
automatic manner in which courts have correlated market share with 
irreparable injury raises a question about whether actors with no 
market share might not still suffer irreparable injuries or be 
inadequately compensated by money damages, and whether all loss 
of market share is irreparable with money damages inadequate to 
compensate for the harm. 
The district courts that have granted permanent injunctions 
relying on the patent holder’s market share have done so under the 
formalistic recitation that high levels of market share correlate with 
irreparable injury to a patent holder absent an injunction and with 
the inadequacy of money damages.144  However, when calculating 
damages for past infringement, juries are routinely called on to take 
into account the market share of the patent holder, thus assigning a 
monetary value to its loss.145  Accordingly, although loss of market 
share and reputational damages that accompany it may be an 
indicator of greater injury, and therefore of a need for higher money 
                                                          
F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007).  But see Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. 
Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that harm to 
Rambus’s “innovation-based business model” was not irreparable because the lost 
opportunity to invest in research was in the past and Rambus would not continue to 
suffer lost royalties going forward). 
 143. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 607. 
 144. See supra Part II.C (identifying cases where the court looked at the market 
share to determine the appropriate relief).  Historically, inadequacy of money 
damages was a jurisdictional issue that had to be pled in order to bring a case in a 
court of equity as opposed to a court of law.  See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What 
History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadquate-Remedy-at-Law 
Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1204–05 (2008); F. Scott Kieff & Henry E. Smith, 
How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis, in REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE:  POLICY 
CHANGES WE CAN AFFORD 55, 69 (2009) (explaining that, previously, the inadequacy 
of the legal remedy was a jurisdictional question).  Post-eBay, however, it is clear that 
the inadequacy of money damages is to be weighed along with the other factors 
indicating the appropriateness of an injunction. 
 145. The Georgia-Pacific factors for determining a reasonable royalty include a 
determination of whether the parties “are competitors in the same territory in the 
same line of business” and “[t]he effect of selling the patented specialty in 
promoting sales of other products.”  Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. 
Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 
(2d Cir. 1971); see also Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 
608, 613 (D. Del. 2007) (taking into account direct competitor status of parties both 
for purposes of calculating reasonable royalties and of determining that money 
damages were inadequate and granting permanent injunction).  Both of these 
factors relate to competitor status and the effect of a patent in spurring other sales, 
which are closely related to and at least equally nebulous as questions of market 
share loss. 
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damages, it does not always follow that the losses can never be 
compensated with money damages.146  Rather, larger monetary 
damages may be warranted for a patent holder with more market 
share.147  In addition, a rule dictating the availability of a permanent 
injunction does not always result in an infringer’s exclusion from the 
market.  Its greatest effect may be on ex ante negotiations, and may 
only mean that any license granted will be much more expensive for 
the infringer.148  The real question, of course, is how large damages 
must be to encourage efficient levels of research ex ante.  Any 
difficulty calculating money damages is steps removed from the 
concerns that led to eBay, specifically, suspect patents and suspect 
entities, their distortions on markets, and the resultant effects on 
access.  For that reason, it is useful to probe further the ways that 
these factors and their application serve the purposes of promoting 
innovation, generally, and of distinguishing situations where NPEs 
exploit market inefficiencies, specifically. 
Ultimately, as discussed above, the right to exclude and the 
corresponding remedy of a permanent injunction for infringement 
are intended to promote innovation.149  Questions about whether the 
first two factors can identify and weed out inefficient actors, and 
whether market share is in fact a helpful indicator of those first two 
factors, bring into focus problems with the emerging rule.  As 
discussed, the market share rule is overbroad and suggests the denial 
of relief to actors that may be innovators.150  It also makes assumptions 
as to different business models that could affect emerging models of 
innovation.  And in some situations, damages may indeed be 
calculated to include lost market share or reputational damages.  The 
analysis until now has assumed that decisions about how to allocate 
permanent injunctions must involve some analysis as to which actors 
are the best innovators—or those who will respond to the availability 
of the equitable remedy by innovating more.  As discussed above, 
however, there are problems with using market share to distinguish 
                                                          
 146. Of course, awarding damages for past infringement is always backwards-
looking.  Thus, use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to grant higher damages does not 
necessarily mean that money damages were adequate, just that there was no other 
option.  Only forward-looking relief can include an injunction. 
 147. See generally Fischer, supra note 69, at 27–28 (providing examples when 
monetary damages are sufficient compensation for royalties). 
 148. See Kaplow, supra note 132, at 1835.  Alternatively, once damages become 
large enough, they may operate as a de facto injunction.  This should occur when 
potential damages are higher than an infringer’s potential profit from infringing. 
 149. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text (discussing the rights granted 
by a patent). 
 150. See supra Part III.A. 
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between innovative actors that achieve optimal levels of innovation 
(and provide optimal levels of access) on the one hand, and actors 
with skewed incentives, who present problems of holdup, restricting 
innovation, and diminishing access on the other.151 
C. The Limits of Market Share as an Indicator of Innovative Incentives 
The opinions analyzing the appropriateness of an injunction use 
market share as a proxy for irreparable injury and inadequacy of 
monetary damages to deny injunctions to patent holders who are 
seen as contributing little to innovation.152  After examining the 
problems with reliance on irreparable injury and inadequate money 
damages as indicators of inefficient actors, as well as the problems 
with reliance on market share as an indicator of irreparable injury 
and inadequate money damages, however, the correlation between 
market share and incentives both to innovate and to bring that 
innovation to market is unclear.  The antitrust literature analyzing 
the effects of market structure on incentives to innovate is 
informative,153 painting a complex picture in which market share is an 
imperfect indicator of innovative potential. 
Although some economists discuss market concentration in terms 
of market share—the measure used by courts evaluating injunctions 
post-eBay—others have analyzed the effects on innovation of 
increased market power.154  Market power is generally considered the 
                                                          
 151. See supra Parts II, III.A (identifying holdup concerns and responding to those 
concerns). 
 152. See supra Part II.C (discussing the emergence of the market share rule). 
 153. The applicability of antitrust theories about the relevance of market power to 
the appropriate strength of patents is not limited to patent remedies.  See, e.g., 
Andrew Blair-Stanek, Increased Market Power as a New Secondary Consideration in Patent 
Law, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 707, 709–10 (2009) (suggesting significant increase in market 
power as an additional secondary consideration in determining whether a patent is 
non-obvious). 
 154. A number of the antitrust laws require an initial showing of market power 
before anti-competitive behavior can be found.  William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981) (explaining 
that market power must be shown for a finding of monopolization or attempted 
monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act and in violation of 
section 7 of the Clayton Act, inter alia).  Market power is also important in the 
context of patent misuse, as, by statute  
[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty 
of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having 
done one or more of the following:  . . . (5) conditioned the license of any 
rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of 
a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, 
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant 
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. 
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“ability of a firm . . . to raise price above the competitive level without 
losing so many sales so rapidly that the increase is unprofitable.”155  It 
is a measure of a firm’s ability to control price in the relevant 
market.156  Often, market share and market power are strongly 
correlated, as control and power tend to be;157 however, this is not 
always the case.158  A firm may have larger market share and yet lack 
market power, a situation that arises in markets with low barriers to 
entry and low start-up costs.159  A shift upwards in price by such a firm 
allows smaller companies and newcomers to capture that market 
share.160  Accordingly, the firm does not have strong market power.  
Conversely, a firm with little or no market share might yet be said to 
have a high level of market power.161  The NPEs that have formed a 
central part of the discussion so far may exhibit considerable market 
power in terms of the prices they can command on licenses.  This 
situation arises in circumstances Lemley and Shapiro noted were 
particularly troublesome in terms of holdup, namely, where the cost 
                                                          
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31, 77 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1801, 1802 (2006) (eliminating the 
presumption of market power in a patented product in tying cases in the antitrust 
context).  The connection between high levels of market power and the potential for 
a finding of patent misuse highlights that, in the antitrust context, suspicion is 
directed toward those who are strong market participants.  This suspicion is lacking 
in the market share rule, which places increasing trust in companies with increasing 
dominance of the market. 
 155. Landes & Posner, supra note 154, at 937; see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 89 (4th ed. 2011) 
(“Market power is a firm’s ability to deviate profitably from marginal cost pricing.”). 
 156. One measure of market power is the Lerner Index, which in one formulation 
is (P – MC)/P, where P is the firm’s price at its profit-maximizing level of output, and 
MC is the firm’s marginal cost at the profit-maximizing level of output.  In a perfectly 
competitive world, the price will equal the marginal cost and the Lerner Index will 
be zero.  In contrast, if a firm is able to raise the price higher and higher (towards 
infinity), the Index value approaches one.  HOVENKAMP, supra note 155, at 89; see also 
Landes & Posner, supra note 154, at 946 (demonstrating the effect of market share in 
relation to market demand elasticity). 
 157. See Mika Kato, Transitoriness of Market Power and Antitrust Activity, 6 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 393, 394–95 (2010) (noting that “the most important single 
criterion for designating monopolization has been a firm’s market share” and that a 
dominant firm can use market power to raise its market share); see also HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 155, at 90–91 (“Courts rely . . . on the fact that there is a positive 
correlation between market share and market power. . . .  All other things being 
equal, a firm with a large market share has a greater ability to increase price 
profitably than a firm with a smaller share.”). 
 158. See Landes & Posner, supra note 154, at 947 (outlining the “pitfalls in 
mechanically using market share data to measure market power”); see also 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 155, at 91 (qualifying general correlation to explain that 
“[m]arket share is an incomplete proxy for market power,” and that market 
elasticities must be taken into account to properly correlate the two). 
 159. Landes & Posner, supra note 154, at 945–49 (explaining that market share 
may not be a good indicator of market power when substitutions for consumption or 
production are readily available). 
 160. Id. at 947. 
 161. Id. 
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of designing around a patent is high and where a patented product 
forms a small part of a complex invention.162  The costliness of 
implementing an alternative and the threat of injunction allow an 
NPE to raise licensing fees without losing customers.163  Thus, 
although market power is often connected to market share, the 
structure of the relevant market also affects levels of market power.  A 
general correlation between market share and market power can be 
assumed to discuss the results and implications of research, though 
there are also special cases in which market power and market share 
are not correlated.164 
Antitrust laws promote competition in the marketplace by 
regulating anti-competitive behavior.  The laws primarily govern 
mergers and acquisitions, and as a result, analysis tends to look at pre-
merger market structures and compare those with potential post-
merger markets.165  The field of antitrust law has a general 
“presumption that greater competition in the form of reduced 
product-market concentration brings improved market performance 
and increased consumer benefits in the form of lower prices, higher 
quality, and higher output.”166  However, this view does not hold in all 
situations.  For example, there are conflicting accounts in the 
literature on the connection between market power and incentives to 
innovate.167  On one side is the “Schumpeterian” view that innovation 
“is hardly conceivable with perfect . . . competition from the start,”168 
                                                          
 162. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2037–39. 
 163. Id. at 2037. 
 164. Even without the correlation, however, market share is still relevant to 
antitrust inquiries.  HOVENKAMP, supra note 155, at 91 (explaining that in many 
situations of concern in antitrust, the “‘power’ basis of the offense, then, is market 
share, not market power as such”). 
 165. See Andrew R. Dick, Coordinated Interaction:  Pre-Merger Constraints and Post-
Merger Effects, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 65, 65–66 (2003) (describing the current 
market analysis conducted when reviewing a merger). 
 166. Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 1, 2 (2007). 
 167. Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger 
Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 27 (1995) (explaining that the connection between 
market structure and innovation has been “debated by economists for decades 
without resolution”). 
 168. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 105 (1950).  
Schumpeter continues to explain that:  
traditional theory is correct in holding that profits above what is necessary in 
each individual case to call forth the equilibrium amount of means of 
production, entrepreneurial ability included, both indicate and in 
themselves imply net social loss and that business strategy that aims at 
keeping them alive is inimical to the growth of total output. 
Id.  And while he agrees that competition would eliminate these profits, he 
nevertheless suggests that because in the course of innovation, “these profits acquire 
new organic functions . . . [the ability of competition to eliminate such profits] 
cannot any longer be unconditionally credited to the account of the perfectly 
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implying that high levels of competition—and thus, low levels of 
market concentration—are not conducive to innovation.  On the 
other side is the view that competition spurs innovation, while 
monopolies or near-monopolies have incentives to suppress it.169  
Each view merits further consideration. 
The Schumpeterian view argues that companies with significant 
market share are better suited to introduce innovations than perfect 
competitors.170  This account stems from the idea that large firms 
have equipment and experience such that the costs of introducing 
innovation are much lower.171  This view argues that the elimination 
of redundant research and development efforts, in addition to other 
savings from economies of scale, are a net benefit that allows for 
more efficient investment in innovation.172  Market concentration also 
“reduces market uncertainty and provides the cash flow required to 
engage in costly and risky R&D on an efficient scale.”173  Finally, 
monopoly or near-monopoly status creates space in the market for 
long-term planning and protects against disorganization of the 
market.174 
In contrast to the Schumpeterian view, the other view is that the 
merger of innovative firms—or R&D firms—in a relatively small 
market will lead to incentives to suppress innovation, or at least slow 
the introduction of innovative products to the market.175  Thus, a firm 
might acquire patents that cover a number of innovative products, 
but would have no incentive to introduce improvements to a market 
that it already controlled.176  Any new product a company considered 
                                                          
competitive model.”  Id.  Although Schumpeter may have thought competition was 
more conducive to small improvements in current technology, he was more 
concerned with larger-scale innovations, or “creative destruction,” that changed the 
structures of current businesses.  Id.  Thus, he thought that what really mattered was 
“competition from the . . . new technology . . . which strikes not at the margins of the 
profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very 
lives.”  Id. at 84. 
 169. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, 
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
609, 619 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962) (noting various assumptions necessary to make 
this conclusion and also concluding that in both monopoly and competitive 
situations, the incentive to invest is less than is socially desirable). 
 170. SCHUMPETER, supra note 168, at 105. 
 171. See id. at 100–01 (noting several advantages available to monopolists). 
 172. Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency 
Concerns in Merger Analysis:  The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 594 
(1995). 
 173. Richard C. Levin et. al., R&D Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure:  
New Evidence on Some Schumpeterian Hypotheses, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 20, 20 (1985). 
 174. SCHUMPETER, supra note 168, at 102–03. 
 175. See Arrow, supra note 169, at 619 (arguing that competitive conditions give 
companies more incentive to invest than monopolistic conditions). 
 176. Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved:  Of the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and 
RAJEC.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012  6:52 PM 
768 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:733 
introducing would be in competition with its other products, and 
thus the company would stand only to divide market share it already 
had among multiple products, while losing the cost of introducing 
the innovation.177  This phenomenon is known as “cannibalization” of 
the market.178  A competitor, in contrast, “receives all of the returns 
from a new invention,” and thus has every incentive to bring 
innovations to market.179 
Another criticism that may be leveled at the Schumpeterian view is 
that it adheres to a dated view of how innovation takes place.  Even if 
Schumpeter is correct that the most efficient means of introducing 
innovation is through large firms whose size allows them to research 
efficiently, the truth is that many large innovations take place outside 
the structure of large businesses and that small start-up companies 
and R&D shops assume the initial risk of following an idea, cashing in 
only later when, and if, it is successful by selling the technology or the 
company to one of those larger firms.180  In addition, large companies 
with market power may find that licensing patents they do not use 
brings in desirable revenue.181  The possibility of a large company 
participating in holdup and troll-like behavior diminishes the idea 
that there are only two types of actors:  licensor-trolls and competitor-
innovators.182  The Schumpeterian view would support stronger 
remedies for those with greater market power because those are the 
most innovative actors in the marketplace.  Under this account, there 
is no reason to suspect them of having skewed incentives.183  Certainly, 
these companies do not exist solely to license their inventions and 
thus do not fit into the problem eBay was meant to address, as framed 
by scholars and practitioners.184  If a company with strong market 
power refuses to license, it is not a holdup for a higher licensing rate 
but a real attempt to stop competitors from offering the innovation 
                                                          
Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 404 (2008) (citing Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in ESSAYS IN THE 
THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 157 (3d ed. 1976)). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See supra note 130 (characterizing the interactions between R&D firms and 
large firms). 
 181. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 57–58 (discussing Texas 
Instruments’s decision in the 1980s to begin asserting patents against its competitors 
and the resulting licensing fees it acquired, amounting to more than fifty-five percent 
of its total net income by 1999). 
 182. Id. (using Texas Instruments’s decision to exercise dormant patents to 
demonstrate how a company could fall outside either category). 
 183. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (describing Schumpeter’s view of 
competition). 
 184. Supra Part II. 
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on the market.  The other view points out that companies with strong 
market power may have other reasons to suppress the introduction of 
new technologies, such as avoidance of market cannibalization.185 
The effects of market power on incentives to innovate are most 
often discussed in the context of mergers and, specifically, mergers in 
innovation markets.186  When evaluating mergers, government 
agencies consider the different, possibly opposing accounts outlined 
above.  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has used the concept 
of innovation markets to evaluate anticompetitive effects of a 
proposed merger and recently reevaluated, inter alia, the effects of 
mergers on innovation markets.187  The horizontal merger guidelines 
recently issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC give 
credence to both accounts of the possible effects of market power on 
innovation.188  First, the guidelines state the conventional idea that 
“[c]ompetition often spurs firms to innovate.”189  Acknowledging the 
cannibalization concern, the guidelines note that mergers may 
diminish incentives “to continue with an existing product-
development effort or reduce[] incentive to initiate development of 
new products”190 because the products of one firm would diminish the 
sales of the other firm.191  Once merged, no incentive remains to 
commit resources to development of products that will not result in 
                                                          
 185. Supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text. 
 186. Innovation markets are described in the FTC and DOJ’s 1995 Intellectual 
Property Guidelines as: 
the research and development directed to particular new or improved goods 
or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development.  
The close substitutes are research and development efforts, technologies, 
and goods that significantly constrain the exercise of market power with 
respect to the relevant research and development, for example by limiting 
the ability and incentive of a hypothetical monopolist to retard the pace of 
research and development. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 11 (1995) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES 
FOR THE LICENSING OF IP], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
0558.htm. 
 187. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf (outlining how agencies analyze 
the effects of mergers on competition, including innovative markets); see also Rapp, 
supra note 167, at 19–20 (discussing the DOJ and FTC’s “innovation market 
approach” to merger analysis and explaining that “[t]he aim of the [then] new policy 
is to introduce dynamic efficiency considerations into merger enforcement, to 
recognize the importance of innovation as a means of nonprice competition and a 
source of welfare gains, and to prevent mergers that would reduce competition in 
innovation”). 
 188. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 187 (outlining the agencies’ 
methods to predict a merger’s effect on competition). 
 189. Id. at 23. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 23–24. 
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new revenue streams.192  Consumers may lose in such situations, both 
because of the loss of innovation and because of diminished choice 
and access to innovation.193  The guidelines, however, also recognize 
another possibility that a merger may “enable innovation that would 
not otherwise take place, by bringing together complementary 
capabilities that cannot be otherwise combined.”194  For that reason, 
the guidelines suggest that the regulatory agencies consider 
efficiencies in research and development resulting from a merger 
that “may spur innovation but not affect short-term pricing.”195  The 
possibilities described in the agency guidelines—that increased 
market power may suppress or augment incentives to innovate—
reflect the ambiguous state of the literature on the topic. 
As recognized in the language of the FTC guidelines, it is possible 
that both accounts are right.  There is no reason, for example, that a 
correlation between market power and innovation need be linear.  
Another possibility is an inverted U-shaped correlation between 
market power and innovation.196  In the mid-1960s, F.M. Scherer 
performed a study measuring the levels at which companies 
employed scientists and engineers as a proxy for investment in 
innovation.197  He found a correlation between increased market 
power and an increase in this measure of innovation; however, the 
correlation reversed itself after a threshold level of concentration was 
met.198  Scherer’s finding seems to give credence to both accounts of 
incentives to innovate as a function of market power.  Thus, Scherer 
validates the Schumpeterian account of a company that does not 
participate in the market—and therefore has no market power—such 
                                                          
 192. Id. at 23. 
 193. See id. at 24 (“Where a merger substantially reduces competition by bringing 
two close substitute products under common ownership, and one of those products 
is eliminated, the merger may also lead to a price increase on the remaining product, 
but that is not necessarily a condition for anticompetitive effect.”).  In the context of 
licensing, the DOJ and FTC have also noted that “even if lawfully acquired and 
maintained, [market power] would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual 
property owner to harm competition through unreasonable conduct in connection 
with such property.”  ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF IP, supra note 186, 
at 4. 
 194. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 187, at 23–24. 
 195. Id. at 31. 
 196. F.M. Scherer, Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engineers, 57 
AM. ECON. REV. 524, 530 (1967) (finding that increased firm size corresponds with 
increased patent activity until a threshold is met, at which point, firm size has a 
downward correlation with patent activity). 
 197. Id. at 524. 
 198. See id. at 530 (“[T]echnological vigor appears to increase with concentration 
mainly at relatively low levels of concentration.  When the four-firm concentration 
ratio exceeds 50 or 55 per cent, additional market power is probably not conducive 
to more vigorous technological efforts and may be downright stultifying.”). 
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as an NPE in a competitive market, predicting such a company is less 
likely to be innovative.199  Similarly, and in line with both Scherer’s 
and Schumpeter’s accounts, a company with a small amount of 
market power is unlikely to have the equipment and expertise to 
develop and bring a product to market.200  As a result, the first 
innovations such a company contemplates will be costlier than they 
would be for a large company already engaged in the general area, 
and that company may be less innovative than a larger company.  On 
the other end of the spectrum, Arrow’s account is validated by 
Scherer’s findings.  Thus, companies with near-monopolies are 
unlikely to introduce innovations that will only cannibalize their own 
profits.201  As a result, although these companies may be innovative, 
they may choose not to bring some innovations to market.  In 
between these extremes are the companies that have the resources, 
expertise, and market space to innovate, in addition to having the 
incentives to continue introducing those innovations to the market to 
remain competitive.202  Many questions remain, and more recent 
empirical analysis has not fully answered the question of how 
correlated market power and innovation are, and on what factors this 
correlation might depend.203  This complex picture may be the reason 
Michael Katz and Howard Shelanski suggest that innovation should 
be taken into account in merger enforcement, but that each case 
must be evaluated “with a presumption that a merger’s effects on 
innovation are neutral except in the case of merger to monopoly, 
where there would be a rebuttable presumption of harm.”204 
The more nuanced antitrust description of the correlation of 
market power and incentives to innovate has been missing from the 
dialogue regarding the grant of permanent injunctions following 
eBay.  As detailed in Part II, the focus leading up to eBay was solely on 
NPEs and the potential for holdup that they represented.205  For that 
reason, the clearest solutions focused on identifying NPEs and 
denying them permanent injunctions.  However, as explained, 
                                                          
 199. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (referring generally to the 
Schumpeterian view). 
 200. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (noting the cannibalism concerns). 
 202. See Arrow, supra note 169, at 619 (determining that there is an optimal level 
of competition needed to spur innovation). 
 203. See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 539–40 
(2010) (demonstrating conditions in which even a monopolist would have to 
innovate). 
 204. Katz & Shelanski, supra note 166, at 6. 
 205. Supra Part II. 
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market share may not be a reliable indicator of irreparable injury.206  
In addition, reliance on market share as an indicator of irreparable 
injury for identifying companies likely to engage in holdup leads to 
questions about whether market share is really an indicator of 
innovative potential and, if so, whether the correlation is a simple, 
linear one.  As detailed, market share may be a helpful indicator of 
innovative potential, but the relationship is not simple, and it is likely 
not linear either.207  Rather, it appears that a complete lack of market 
power may, but does not always, result in lower incentives to innovate 
and more opportunities for holdup and other inefficiencies.208  
Exceptions are possible for entities that have specialized in 
innovation, such as some start-up companies and universities.  This 
Part’s exploration of literature analyzing effects of large amounts of 
market power suggests that inefficient incentive structures lurk there, 
too, and calls into question the usefulness of market power as a proxy 
for innovative potential.  In particular, companies with high levels of 
market power have incentives not to introduce innovations to the 
market.209 
Thus far, it has been demonstrated that the first two factors of the 
equitable test for injunctions may not be ideal for identifying actors 
likely to keep innovation from the market.  In addition, increased 
market share may not always point to an irreparable injury or the 
inadequacy of money damages.210  It is possible that if market share is 
a helpful indicator of innovative potential, both very high and very 
low levels of market share will correlate with incentives to keep 
innovation from the market; as a result, injunction-seeking 
companies with high levels of market share should be looked at 
skeptically, as well.  Market power and market share may not always 
correlate.  In situations where NPEs could be said to have high levels 
of market power but not market share, their lack of innovative 
potential—and incentives to hold up—would make the grant of an 
injunction less likely under the current market share rule or under a 
                                                          
 206. See supra Part III.A (discussing the limitations of the market share test in 
assessing injury). 
 207. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (describing the non-linear nature 
of the relationship between innovation and market share). 
 208. See supra Part II.A (finding efficiencies associated with NPEs). 
 209. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text (referencing how companies 
with dominant market power have cannibalism concerns in introducing innovation 
into the market). 
 210. This Article does not suggest that market share should no longer be 
considered relevant to those factors; it is.  However, market share is not 
determinative, and the balancing test should not be strained by forcing an analysis 
here that belongs elsewhere. 
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rule that required more scrutiny for high levels of market power.  On 
the other hand, companies with high levels of market share that have 
low levels of market power (because there are low barriers to entry 
and start-up costs in the relevant industry) would be more likely to 
receive an injunction under the market share rule and under a rule 
that required more scrutiny for high levels of market power.  To the 
extent that market share and market power are not correlated, a rule 
that requires more scrutiny for companies that exhibit market power 
would not change the analysis of which companies are likely to 
engage in holdup or suppression of technology.  Because the effect of 
such inefficiencies is an improper balancing of incentives to innovate, 
and because the result on either end of the market power spectrum is 
a lack of access to technology by the public, the next Part addresses 
the public interest prong of the equitable test to determine its utility 
in identifying situations where market power is determinative of 
innovative potential and usefulness of an injunction. 
IV. USING MARKET SHARE CRITICALLY:  A GREATER ROLE FOR THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST PRONG 
Public interest plays a unique role in patent law.  Patent suits may 
determine rights of private parties, but they also routinely set the 
scope, validity, and enforceability of patents211—all of which are 
secured against the public.212  Thus, patents that are misused, 
although otherwise valid, may be deemed unenforceable.213  Likewise, 
overbroad patent claims may be invalidated and the rulings given res 
judicata effect, or may simply be interpreted to have a scope limited 
to what the patentee can rightfully claim to have invented.214  
Similarly, the remedy for patent infringement is about more than the 
allocation of rights between the parties.  In weighing the 
                                                          
 211. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 139, at 76.  The U.S.P.T.O. is also routinely a 
party when the denial of a patent is challenged.  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1398, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (challenging the validity of DNA molecule 
patents); Grasty v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 211 F. App’x 952, 953 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (per curiam) (challenging the denial of a petition to revive abandoned 
application). 
 212. While the consequences of judgments vary depending on which party 
prevails and whether a final judgment is obtained at the district or appellate court 
level, the allocation of rights between private parties will affect the availability of 
products to the public and their prices. 
 213. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492, 52 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 30, 33 (1942) (describing the unenforceability of a patent misused in a tying 
scheme, the Court explained that “[i]t is a principle of general application that 
courts, and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid where 
the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public interest”). 
 214. See supra note 64 (explaining judicial responses to overbroad patent claims). 
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appropriateness of an injunction, however, the public interest factor 
is currently a simple check that public health is not endangered by 
entry of an injunction.215  I suggest a modest expansion, such that 
courts determine that the public interest in the balance struck by the 
patent grant is also represented in the balance of equities of the 
injunction grant.216  Ultimately, the problems the Court attempted to 
address in eBay are problems best weighed in terms of the public 
interest because it is a more straightforward approach to those 
concerns than using market share as a proxy for innovative capability. 
The concerns underlying eBay were not merely about 
compensation for patent holders; rather, they implicated the 
underlying purpose of the patent system to fuel innovation and the 
balance it strikes to accomplish that.217  Moreover, the use of market 
share as the sole measure of the effect of the remedy on the patent 
holder, under the first two prongs of the equitable test, is a proxy for 
innovative potential that becomes less dependable in situations in 
which companies have high levels of market power.  Market share still 
tells a story about the nature of harm to a patent holder and the 
ability of money damages to remedy that harm.  Thus, in nascent 
markets, an infringer’s usurpation of market share may indeed be 
difficult to calculate, and an ongoing injunction may be the fairest 
way to grant ongoing relief.  For some business structures, however, 
the market share does not answer the question of irreparable injury 
and adequacy of money damages.  The same concerns underlying the 
NPE problem—public access to innovation and incentivizing 
innovation218—that are now routinely considered under the first two 
prongs of the equitable test may also be considered under the public 
interest prong.  Market share may tell a story in that analysis too, but 
                                                          
 215. See infra note 230 and accompanying text (describing the possible public 
health reasons for denying an injunction). 
 216. Judge Aldrich’s dissent in Continental Paper Bag, at the circuit level, invoked 
the public interest by suggesting that nonuse of a patent by a competitor, for the 
purpose of deriving a monopoly over another product, is “an attitude which offends 
public policy, the conscience of equity, and the very spirit and intention of the law 
upon which the legal right [to exclude] is founded.”  Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. 
Paper Bag Co., 150 F. 741, 745 (1st Cir. 1906) (Aldrich, J., dissenting), aff’d, 210 U.S. 
405 (1908).  The Judge further referenced the public interest in suggesting that the 
equitable remedy of an injunction was inappropriate, writing that  
the act of acquiring a valuable right, into which the public interest enters, 
not for use, but to destroy or withdraw from use, alone involves a certain 
measure of wrong, because, upon natural and fundamental grounds, it is in a 
sense wrong to buy and withhold a thing of public interest and benefit . . . . 
Id. at 751.  He continued that in such situations “the right to equitable relief in aid of 
the abstract right is forfeited.”  Id. 
 217. Supra text accompanying notes 19–21. 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51 (outlining the NPE problem). 
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it is a story cabined by acknowledging antitrust concerns that come 
with large amounts of market share, and it should act as a 
counterweight to the assumption about the level of injury and 
consequent rewards. 
The interests encompassed under the public interest factor of the 
equitable test are as follows:  (1) granting sufficiently strong rights to 
incentivize innovation,219 (2) gaining access to the invention, through 
the patent disclosure and its eventual dedication to the public 
domain,220 and (3) gaining earlier access to the invention through its 
market availability by the patentee or its licensees.221  The first and 
second interests, encompassing disclosure of inventions and 
encouragement of innovation, are equally satisfied whether the 
patent holder is a practicing or a non-practicing entity.  Indeed, these 
interests are satisfied by the time a patent application is filed.222  The 
public interest associated with situations of non-existent market 
power is the interest in access.  There is a societal interest in both 
public access to patented technology and access of other innovators 
working in the art to advance it further.223  These access-related 
interests are not equally served in the case of practicing and non-
practicing entities.  When an invention is practiced, it is likely to be 
available to the public at some price,224 and thus available to other 
innovators who wish to purchase and use it.  An entity that does not 
practice its invention—and refuses to license it—withholds these 
benefits from the public entirely.  One exception to this 
categorization is independent invention.  When a non-patent holder 
has independently come up with the same idea as a patent holder, 
the patent disclosure must have been less valuable than in cases 
where there is no independent invention, given that the same thing 
                                                          
 219. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480, 181 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 673, 678 (1974) (noting that the right of exclusion provides an incentive to 
risk enormous costs in time, research, and development). 
 220. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shokestsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
736, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1712 (2002) (explaining that “patent rights are 
given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public”). 
 221. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 672 (1984) (acknowledging that the patent system allows 
public access to the products after exclusive control has expired). 
 222. Patent applications are generally published within eighteen months of filing 
but certainly upon the grant of a patent.  35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006).  But see generally 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (arguing for 
stronger disclosure requirements). 
 223. See generally Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 672 
(noting that the public interest lies in the benefits derived from the labors of 
inventors). 
 224. This excludes inventions that are used within a company for its own 
purposes, such as manufacturing. 
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was invented without access to the disclosure.225  In addition, where 
an invention is likely to be independently invented, it may be that the 
strong, exclusive rights associated with patents are not necessary to 
spur the innovation in the first place.226  In terms of remedies, 
although independent invention is not a defense to a claim of patent 
infringement, it does allow an infringer to escape the enhanced 
damages associated with willful infringement.227  Historically, courts 
have found that the public interest in promoting innovation weighs 
in favor of the grant of an injunction.228  Rarely, the access interest has 
been invoked to deny injunctions for reasons relating to public 
health.229  After discussing that history, I suggest that the access 
interest need not be so sparingly invoked. 
A public interest analysis may be useful in identifying cases where 
injunctions would serve the goals of access and innovation.  The 
public interest factor has been used rarely to deny injunctions.  When 
the public interest has been considered relevant, it has been for 
public health reasons;230 otherwise, it generally has been assumed that 
the public interest mainly lies in strong enforcement of patent 
rights.231  City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge,232 a 1934 case, is the most 
frequently mentioned case in this context.  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant 
                                                          
 225. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 475, 479 (2006) (noting that a patent award is excessive when two or 
more inventors independently create the same invention). 
 226. Id.; see Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of 
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1677–78 (2011) (“[W]here one party does not seek a 
patent and it appears that this failure to seek a patent is not simply a strategic gambit 
to deny the other party a patent, such evidence strongly suggests that a patent 
incentive was not needed to motivate the invention.”). 
 227. David S. Olsen, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously:  The Case for 
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 194 n.45 (2009). 
 228. See infra note 245 (discussing the public interest considerations surrounding 
injunctions). 
 229. See infra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing the public health 
considerations surrounding injunctions). 
 230. See City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593, 21 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 69, 75 (7th Cir. 1934) (declining permanent injunction against the city after 
finding infringement because enjoining use of the sewage treatment method would 
affect public health).  But see Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., No. 04-CV-513-BR, 2007 
WL 4180682, at *8 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 2007) (finding insufficient evidence of a public 
health issue to find that an injunction would be a disservice to the public interest), 
aff’d, 551 F.3d 1323, 1331, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1612, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting 
that “in another case, the public interest factor may so strongly weigh against 
enjoining the infringer that an injunction would be inappropriate”). 
 231. Julie A. Burger & Justin Brunner, A Court’s Dilemma:  When Patents Conflict with 
Public Health, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 20 (2007); see Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 
F.2d 1446, 1458, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (upholding the 
district court in finding that public interest in enforcing patent rights outweighed 
any other public interest considerations). 
 232. 69 F.2d 577, 21 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 69 (7th Cir. 1934). 
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of an injunction against the City, despite upholding its finding that 
the City infringed a patent over a method and apparatus for sewage 
treatment.233  The court explained that the result of an injunction 
would be that the City “would close the sewage plant, leaving the 
entire community without any means for the disposal of raw sewage 
other than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby polluting its waters 
and endangering the health and lives of that and other adjoining 
communities.”234  Another notable case in which an injunction was 
rejected for public interest reasons that specifically related to public 
health was Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation.235  There, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit noted that the patent holder did not intend to use or 
license the patented process to irradiate oleomargarine such that it is 
supplemented by vitamin D.236  This fortification of oleomargarine, 
the evidence showed, prevented and cured rickets, a disease that 
disproportionately affected the poor.237  The court made these notes 
“as a tribunal concerned that equitable processes not be used contra 
to the public interest, a matter in which the court is not ‘at the mercy’ 
of the parties.”238  Although the Vitamin Technologists court discussed 
the public interest in granting an injunction, its language was that of 
patent misuse,239 a doctrine that may render a patent entirely 
unenforceable but that now, by statute, does not apply to refusal to 
practice a patent.240  A defense of patent misuse may include 
                                                          
 233. Id. at 593, 21 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 82. 
 234. Id., 21 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 82. 
 235. 146 F.2d 941, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 262 (9th Cir. 1944). 
 236. Id. at 945, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 267. 
 237. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 267.  Although the connection between vitamin D 
deficiency and rickets sounds like a problem distinctly from another era, the 
importance of the vitamin is in the news again, with a claim that it “promises to be 
the most talked-about and written-about supplement of the decade.”  Jane E. Brody, 
What Do You Lack?  Probably Vitamin D, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at D7. 
 238. Vitamin Technologists, 146 F.2d at 945, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 267.  Ultimately, 
however, the court determined that the patents were invalid, and thus its analysis of 
the public interest was not dispositive to the ultimate outcome of the case.  Id., 63 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 267. 
 239. Id. at 944, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 266 (noting that “it is not the private use but 
the public interest which is dominant in the patent system,” and “[t]he patent is a 
privilege[,] [b]ut it is a privilege which is conditioned by a public purpose” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 240. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).  Patent misuse is a defense to a claim of patent 
infringement, allowing for non-enforcement when a patentee has sought to extend 
the patent grant beyond its scope.  However, section 271(d) of the patent statute 
explicitly states that “refus[al] to license or use any rights to the patent” does not 
alone constitute misuse such that a patent owner shall be denied relief.  Id.  Thus, 
nonuse of a patent does not allow for a finding of misuse if there also is not an 
element of monopolization of the market beyond that allowed by the patent.  The 
Court’s concern, expressed in eBay, with “the economic function of the patent 
holder”—namely, its concern with patent holders who exist merely to extract high 
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allegations of antitrust violations;241 however, misuse may be found 
without showing an antitrust violation when enforcement of a patent 
would be “contrary to public policy.”242  Thus, public health concerns 
have led courts to deny permanent injunctions in some cases on the 
basis of the public interest; however, this is the extent of use of the 
public interest factor in the denial of injunctions.243  For the most 
part, the public interest is considered to favor a strong patent system 
with the strong remedy of an injunction to support it.244 
Post-eBay case law has, for the most part, continued to assert that 
the public has an overriding interest in granting strong patents and 
responding to their infringement with strong remedies to fuel further 
innovation.245  However, some courts have recognized that, as Justice 
Kennedy suggested, the public interest may not always be served by 
an injunction.246  Thus, some courts have found that the public 
                                                          
licensing fees through the threat of litigation—cannot be addressed with a finding of 
patent misuse, despite the fact that in such cases, “the threat of an injunction is 
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations . . . and an injunction may not 
serve the public interest.”  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97, 
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1581 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Indeed, where 
patent misuse is found, the arguably draconian remedy of unenforceability is 
imposed on the patent.  Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the 
Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1616–17 (1990) (“[O]ptimal 
punishment is unlikely in the normal case because the level of patent misuse 
sanction is not related to the severity of the patent misuse violation.”). 
 241. HOVENKAMP, supra note 155, at 262 (discussing application of section 2 of the 
Clayton Act, which forbids tying of unpatented products to those under patent). 
 242. Id. (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 52 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 30 (1942)). 
 243. See supra note 230 (noting the rare occurrence of denial of an injunction due 
to public interest concerns). 
 244. See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes, 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2006) (“[T]he public maintains an interest in protecting the rights of patent 
holders, and injunctions serve that interest.”); see also infra note 245 and 
accompanying text (discussing the general belief, after eBay, that emphasizes the 
public interest benefits of encouraging innovation through enforcement of patent 
rights). 
 245. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1097, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the public interest in 
encouraging innovation); FURminator, Inc. v. Kim Laube & Co., No. 4:08CV00367 
ERW, 2011 WL 1226944, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2011) (noting the importance of 
injunctions in serving the public interest), appeal dismissed, 440 Fed. App’x 924 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011); Enpat, Inc. v. Budnic, No. 6:11-cv-86-PCF-KRS, 2011 WL 1196420, at *5 
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting that “the public interest factor typically weighs in 
favor of granting injunctive relief”); Smith & Nephew, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d at 985 
(“[T]he public maintains an interest in protecting the rights of patent holders, and 
injunctions serve that interest.”); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. 
Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (“The public has an interest in maintaining a 
strong patent system.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 516 F.3d 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 246. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1577, 1581 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that when “the 
threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal 
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an 
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interest in access weighs more heavily than the private interests of the 
litigating parties; nevertheless, those courts still framed their decision 
in terms of the market share rule, concluding that in their cases, a 
competitor with market share would not suffer irreparable injury 
from the denial of the injunction.247  In two district court cases 
involving the same parties and coronary stent technology, the courts 
denied injunctions after analysis of market share and consideration 
of the public interest in a diverse stent market.248  These cases are 
illustrative of competing concerns that are all being played out in the 
first two factors of the equitable test, but that would be clarified if 
they were examined through a public interest lens. 
In Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.,249 the 
Delaware district court found no irreparable injury and that money 
damages would be adequate where the parties were in a market with 
three head-to-head competitors by looking at market share data and 
determining that increased market share for the infringing firm did 
not necessarily come at the expense of the patent holder.250  The 
court noted that of the three competitors, Advanced Cardiovascular 
Systems, which changed hands during the course of litigation and is 
now part of Abbott Labs, had a sixty-three percent market share of 
the bare metal stent market, compared with infringer Medtronic’s 
seventeen percent share.251  The court also noted that Advanced 
Cardiovascular Systems’s market share was predicted to drop to fifty-
six percent by 2010, infringer Medtronic’s market share was 
predicted to increase to thirty-three percent, and third-party BSC’s 
market share was predicted to drop to eleven percent in that time 
frame.252  As a result, the court concluded that the infringer 
apparently was gaining market share at the expense of both of the 
other competitors, “clouding the relationship between Medtronic’s 
infringement and ACS’s losses.”253  In addition, the court found 
                                                          
injunction may not serve the public interest”). 
 247. See discussion infra accompanying notes 248–266 (discussing the role of 
market share in a court’s decision to issue an injunction). 
 248. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C95-03577-DLJ, 
2008 WL 4647384, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2008) (denying a motion to modify the 
injunction because it had been in force for eight years, any loss of market share 
could be proven and compensated, and there was strong public interest in access to 
multiple types of stents); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, 
Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554, 561 (D. Del. 2008) (noting public interest in access to 
different types of stents). 
 249. 579 F. Supp. 2d 554 (D. Del. 2008). 
 250. Id. at 559. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
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willingness to license was evidence that money damages would be 
adequate.254  Thus, in contrast to the general rule of many other 
courts, the court here determined that a competitor with market 
share would not suffer irreparable injury and that money damages 
would be adequate.  In regards to the public interest factor, the court 
cited the “strong public interest in maintaining diversity in the 
coronary stent market,” which was “previously recognized by this 
court and the Federal Circuit.”255 
A month later, a California district court also denied an extension 
of injunctive relief to Advanced Cardiovascular Systems in a lawsuit 
involving catheters used in percutaneous transluminal coronary 
angioplasty.256  The court was faced with the question of whether to 
extend the injunction to reflect the possible extension the patent 
term would receive, making up for time spent testing the products for 
regulatory compliance.257  In finding no irreparable injury, the court 
explained that any loss of market share would not unduly burden 
such a large company and could be proved and compensated.258  In 
this case, the parties were two of the larger companies in the market 
and in direct competition with each other, although the court also 
noted that two other competitor companies had larger market share 
in the market it found to be relevant.259  The court suggested that 
although Abbott might lose some market share to Medtronic when 
the court denied the injunction, “nothing suggests that this loss could 
have any significant effect on the continued ability of Abbott to 
effectively compete in the DES market or to continue to invest in 
relevant research and development.”260  The court relied on Abbott’s 
willingness to license in finding that money damages would be 
                                                          
 254. Id. at 560–61. 
 255. Id. at 561.  Compare Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 
865–66, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[S]tandards of the public 
interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and need 
for injunctive relief . . . .” (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)), with Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 209–10 (D. Mass. 2008) (granting injunction and noting 
court’s original impression that public interest would be served by allowing 
introduction to the pharmaceutical market, but that ultimately, public is better 
served by a “robust patent system”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 580 F.3d 1340, 92 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 256. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C95-03577-DLJ, 
2008 WL 4647384, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2008).  Percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty is a method of delivering stents using catheters. 
 257. Id. at *9. 
 258. Id. at *10. 
 259. See id. (using the market for percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty 
performed with drug-eluting stents). 
 260. Id. 
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adequate.261  Turning to the public interest inquiry, the court found it 
would be in the public interest to allow the infringing device to enter 
the market.262  In so finding, the court noted that extending the 
injunction would leave just one product on the market at that 
“advanced technological level.”263  The court then determined that 
the public interest further did not favor extending the injunction to 
account for the regulatory testing done for Food and Drug 
Administration approval264 because the patent holder had profited 
from the patent with no delay for testing.265 
Although both courts appear to have come to a reasonable 
conclusion, it is not clear how the market share decision can be 
squared with all the other decisions discussed in Part III.C.  However, 
these cases would make sense if market share were returned to a 
lower level of importance under the irreparable injury and 
inadequacy of monetary damages factors, while simultaneously 
performing a function under a new, stronger public interest inquiry.  
Because the companies are not fighting for market share in an 
emerging market, and because there is adequate (indeed, ample) 
data about the relevant markets, the loss of market share would not 
result in a finding of irreparable injury.  However, the high levels of 
market share commanded by Abbott in the coronary stent market 
would lead courts to carefully probe the effects of an injunction on 
access.266 
Therefore, nothing prevents a more nuanced analysis under the 
public interest prong of the test.  Such an analysis would recognize 
the public interest in a strong patent system such that innovation is 
incentivized.  NPEs may be very problematic in a few situations, but 
                                                          
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at *11 (citing Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 99 Fed. App’x 928, 
935 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[S]trong public interest supports a broad choice of drug-
eluting stents . . . .”); Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-027-SLR, 
2003 WL 22843072, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 21, 2003) (noting the “obvious concern of 
depriving the public of the best and safest medical devices by limiting 
competition”)). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at *13.  Abbott had not yet received an extension in patent term; its 
request was pending at the time of the decision.  Id. at *9. 
 265. Id. at *10. 
 266. These cases related to technologies that affect public health.  Unlike cases 
that previously involved denial of injunctions for public health reasons, however, 
these situations do not present the same urgency or need to avoid a major, public 
health catastrophe.  Thus, these cases would not fit the mold for other injunction 
denials based on public health. 
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they do not constitute the majority of plaintiffs in patent cases. 267  
Thus, including analysis of the innovative contribution of patent 
holders as a public interest inquiry would not lead to wholesale denial 
of injunctions.  In contrast, the market share inquiry is over-inclusive, 
so that courts using the current rule have to first identify, then 
exclude, entities that have no market share but are productively 
engaged in research and development from the market share rule.  
Moreover, the interest of the public is the appropriate legal lens for 
evaluating the public interest in access to a particular invention, as 
well as the interest of other innovators in using an invention.  
Specifically, in cases where a patent holder does not practice the 
patented invention, the public interest in access is not met when the 
patent holder has no market share, such as in the case of an NPE.  
For patent holders with intermediate amounts of market share who 
do not practice the patented invention, one can presume that 
competition in the market is furnishing alternatives, as is the patent 
holder, who has presumably made an efficient business decision to 
pursue another line of innovation over the patented technology. 
On the far end of the market share spectrum, however, the 
efficiency of a patent holder’s decision not to practice its patent is 
also questionable, and the public may again be deprived of access to 
the innovation.  In near-monopoly or strong oligopoly situations, a 
company may choose not to implement innovation because of 
concerns of cannibalizing its own sales.  In addition, without 
competitors, companies have less reason to invest in new products, as 
they already have full command of the market.  This leads to fewer 
choices on the market for consumers where a company decides to 
market just one of a few innovations and worse choices when a 
company chooses not to introduce innovations at all to maximize 
sales of what would otherwise be an obsolete product.  As a result, 
access interests are also weightier for companies with high levels of 
market power requesting permanent injunctions.  Although the 
access interest may weigh more heavily for patent holders with strong 
market power who do not use their inventions, I am not suggesting 
that injunctions routinely be denied for large companies, either.  
Businesses should have wide leeway to decide what inventions to 
                                                          
 267. According to a 2009 study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, in the eighteen 
districts with the most NPE litigation, from 1995–2008, NPEs accounted for anywhere 
from 10.6% to 46.2% of patent suits.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK:  
PATENT LITIGATION TRENDS AND THE INCREASING IMPACT OF NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 19 
(2009), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/ 
assets/2009-patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
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pursue and how to be most profitable.268  Nonetheless, merely 
participating in the market should not insulate a company if that 
company is pursuing strategies that would result in the denial of an 
injunction to an NPE. 
Unlike analysis under the irreparable injury and inadequacy of 
monetary damages prongs of the equitable test, the public interest 
analysis would allow courts to account for the potentially skewed 
incentives of a patent holder with either very high or very low levels of 
market power and craft an appropriate remedy.  This public interest 
analysis would not have the problems of being over- and under-
inclusive and would allow courts to directly address the concerns that 
led to the eBay case. 
CONCLUSION 
District courts have mostly, and correctly, denied injunctions to 
those entities about whom alarms were sounded leading up to, and in 
the wake of, the eBay decision.  However, courts’ reliance on market 
power as a proxy for determining when a patent holder would suffer 
irreparable injury absent an injunction and where money damages 
would not be adequate proves problematic.  This reliance is 
particularly problematic when viewed through the lens of the 
underlying purpose of the patent grant, which is incentivizing 
innovation.  Some extremely innovative business structures do not 
possess strong market share.  Even to the extent that some entities 
with little market share are less likely to innovate and more likely to 
inefficiently hold up innovation, the hold up concern also applies to 
firms with large amounts of market share.  Although antitrust 
literature varies as to the details, it appears that at either extreme end 
of the spectrum, actors have lower incentives to innovate.  By 
focusing only on market share in the context of irreparable injury 
and inadequacy of money damages, courts are narrowly and 
mistakenly deciding which actors are efficient and thus deserving of 
injunctions.  This Article argues that the underlying concern in eBay 
is best characterized as one of access to innovation, thus highlighting 
the public interest factor of the equitable test.  Courts generally 
presume that the public interest weighs in favor of injunctions absent 
a public health interest in access.  However, by weighing the public 
                                                          
 268. See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 428 (1908) 
(holding that patent was not “‘deliberately held in nonuse for a wrongful purpose’” 
where the purpose was “to make more money with the existing . . . machines than 
could be made with new . . . machines, when the cost of building the latter was taken 
into account”). 
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interest in access in all cases—not just those that involve public 
health—against its interest in incentivizing innovation, courts would 
be able to take a more nuanced view of the link between market 
power and innovative potential. 
